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European Financial Market Integration: 
Evidence on the Emergence of a Single Eurozone Retail Banking Market 
 
Abstract 
This study provides new evidence on the emergence of a single Eurozone retail banking market. Applying 
cointegration methodology, the empirical results indicate only limited evidence for integration before January 1, 
1999. The introduction of the Euro manifests itself in structural breaks after which evidence for an emerging 
uniform Eurozone banking market is increasing. After investigating the interest pass-through we conclude that the 
single currency has the potential to "complete" the single market, however, not so much in the sense of cross-border 
arbitrage, but by means of a smooth and uniform pass-through process in the presence of a single monetary policy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1988 the Commission of the European Communities commissioned a study, now widely known 
as the Cecchini report (Commission of the European Communities, 1988), which derived 
quantitative estimates of the benefits of financial market integration. The study predicted that post-
integration prices will fall to a level equal to the prices of the country with the lowest pre-integration 
prices. In order to realize these predicted benefits, the Second Banking Directive (2nd BD) was 
implemented on January 1, 1993 for the member countries of the European Union (EU) with the 
intent to provide an appropriate regulatory environment for the single European banking market. 
However, as Kleimeier and Sander (2000) have shown, the degree of integration in the retail 
banking market before the introduction of the single currency January 1, 1999 was limited, leading 
to the question to what extent the single currency will contribute to the creation of a single retail 
banking market. For example, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000) from the European Central Bank 
(ECB) board argues that the "multiplicity of currencies in the single market was a fundamental 
factor behind the preservation of the segmentation of the banking industry" and that "it is indeed the 
existence of a single currency and a single central bank which very often unifies a banking system". 
Nonetheless, while most observers find at least some evidence for the emergence of a single 
banking industry in the area of wholesale banking and capital market activities, they remain more 
skeptical in the area of retail banking (Padoa-Schioppa 2000, Diez Guardia 2000).  
 
The aim of our study is to provide further evidence on the emergence of a single Eurozone retail 
banking market. To do so, we develop a methodology that allows us to shed light onto the 
following: How effective has the single-market cum Second Banking Directive undertaking been 
so far in integrating credit markets? Are nominal and real cost of borrowing converging across 
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Europe and is convergence really a sign of integration? Is there evidence for differential effects 
in various credit products? How effective is the transmission of interest rate changes by 
monetary policy onto lending rates and are there differences in the "pass-through" among the 
countries of the Eurozone and among the various lending rates? What has so far been the 
contribution of the single currency and what is its likely future impact on this process? 
 
The attempt to answer these questions today is ambitious for the very simple reason that the data 
available by now is still limited. However bearing in mind the Lucas critic, drawing conclusions 
from past data after almost revolutionary changes in the European monetary system might be even 
more risky than relying on an almost three-year experience with a single currency. Nonetheless, we 
fully bear in mind the limitations of the analysis resulting from the brief sample period but hope to 
develop an approach that allows us to answer these research questions in principal and with 
increasing confidence as the integration process unfolds. In particular, as this study follows up on an 
earlier consultancy report (Kleimeier and Sander, 2002) we find that using now an extended 
database our earlier results and conclusions are by and large validated thus pointing to the 
robustness of the approach. 
 
2. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN RETAIL BANKING MARKET?  
2.1. Recent developments in European banking 
Bank lending plays a dominant role in providing funds to the corporate, private, and public 
sector in Europe. Based on data for 1999 provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) (2000a), 
in the Eurozone bank loans amounted to 100.4 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
which is clearly higher than for example 48.4 per cent in the United States (US). In contrast, 
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market based forms of funding which are an alternative for corporations are used to a lesser 
extend in the Eurozone. Outstanding domestic debt securities amount to 88.8 per cent in the 
Eurozone compared to 164.6 per cent in the US and stock market capitalization amounts to 71.1 
per cent in the Eurozone compared to 163.3 per cent in the US. 
 
The banking market in the European Union (EU) has been shaped to a large extend by the 
regulatory process aiming at liberalization and integration. At the beginning of the 1980s, the 
banking markets of Italy, France, and Belgium could be considered to be highly regulated, 
whereas banking markets in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and the Netherlands were only 
slightly regulated (De Bondt 1998). For example, capital controls were in place in many highly 
regulated countries. Furthermore, interest rate regulations existed as late as 1992 or 1993 in some 
EU member countries (Diez Guardia 2000). Specifically, interest rates were deregulated early in 
the UK (1979), Germany (1981) and the Netherlands (1981) compared to Denmark (1988), 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg (all 1990), Spain and Portugal (both 1992), Ireland and 
Greece (both 1993). Even if the establishment of the common market has been an objective in 
the EU since the 1957 Treaty of Rome and has been reinforced by the 1985 White Paper and the 
1986 Single European Act, very little had been achieved for the banking markets until the 2nd BD 
of 1989. Regarding key regulatory elements, the First Banking Directive (1st BD) of 1977 which 
allowed for cross border branching under the host country rule1 was not very effective in 
reducing differences between national regulatory systems and was thus followed by a 2nd BD. 
This 2nd BD relied on three fundamental principles of harmonization, mutual recognition, and 
                                                          
1 Under the host country rule a bank had to obtain permission to operate in a foreign country by the supervisory 
agencies of that country. 
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home country control and supervision2 - the latter representing a complete turnaround in 
regulatory policy compared to the 1st BD. Since 1986, additional directives which are aimed at 
further harmonization of the different national EU banking markets have been passed concerning 
bank supervision, capital adequacy, solvency standards, money laundering, consumer credit, or 
publishing and consolidation of annual accounts to name but a few3. In the area of consumer 
credit, in 1986 the European Community introduced a consumer credit directive. The main two 
objectives of this directive were consumer protection and facilitation of cross-border credit by 
means of harmonization of the banks’ information provision to its customers. This directive was 
amended and completed by two more consumer credit directives in 1990 and 1998, respectively4. 
In 1999, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) has been launched which is widely 
considered the principal blueprint for financial integration in the EU by means of 42 measures to 
foster the progress towards an integrated market. By spring 2002, 26 of these 42 measures have 
been finalized, but the remaining measures are still considered to be crucial. Thus, the Barcelona 
European Council in March 2002 has called for a full implementation of all measures by 2005.   
On January 1, 1999, the Euro replaced the national currencies of Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Of the 
remaining EU countries, Greece initially failed to meet the required economic criteria but joined 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 2001, whereas Denmark, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom decided not join the EMU as yet.  
 
                                                          
2 Harmonisation should lead to a system where banks operating in several countries face a common set of EU 
regulations. Mutual recognition implies that the banking charter of the home country is sufficient to operate in all 
EU countries. Home country rule, finally, stipulates that foreign owned banks are regulated by their home country 
and not by the host country. 
3 For details see Kleimeier (2001), Kleimeier and Sander (2000), Diez Guardia (2000), Zimmerman (1995). 
4 For details and evaluation see Diez Guardia (2000). 
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Assessing the Eurozone banking markets, integration can be considered as far advanced from a 
purely legal perspective (Zimmerman 1995, Bredemeier 1995). However, non-regulatory barriers 
to integration such as cultural differences in consumer behaviors such as preferences for types of 
credit continue to exist. Whereas Eurozone interbank and wholesale markets are considered to be 
integrated, the extent of integration in the retail banking markets appears to be limited. For one 
thing, retail lending products are less exposed to international competitive pressure as proximity to 
customers is important even when one accounts for advances in modern distribution technology. 
Furthermore, this impression is enforced when looking at the limited extent of cross-border 
lending. The focus in bank lending and deposit taking is clearly domestic. In 1999, 79.8 per cent 
of all loans and 72.8 per cent of loans to the non-bank private sector were domestic. Similarly, 
72.8 per cent of all deposits and 86.5 per cent of deposits to the non-bank private sector were 
domestic. Moreover, 66.7 per cent of all government securities and 39.5 per cent of all non-bank 
private securities are domestic. Only for this last business activity is the foreign business 
dominant and Euro area holdings amount to 19.1 per cent. However, the growth rates for all 
Eurozone activities - with the exception of deposits from the non-bank private sector - are 
positive and larger than the corresponding growth rates for domestic activities. Furthermore, the 
market shares of foreign banks in Europe are still very low in most countries in 1997. In 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Spain foreign banks 
have a market share of less than 12 per cent. In Belgium and Ireland, their market shares lie in 
the mid-range with 36.3 and 53.6 per cent, respectively. Only in Luxembourg foreign banks 
dominate the market with a share of 99.9 per cent (ECB 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b). Similar 
figures have been reported by Diez Guardia (2000). 
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One reason for these localized retail banking markets where banks are neither reaching out for all 
prospective Eurozone customers, nor are consumers shopping around for credits in the whole 
Eurozone is given by Padoa-Schioppa (2000). He refers to a survey conducted by the US Federal 
Reserve Bank that has found that in the United States 90% of the banks clientele is located 
within a distance of less than 20 miles of the bank's premises. He concludes that "proximity is an 
intrinsic characteristic of the retail market with or without the emergence of a currency 
embracing a wider area". One should, however, read such results with caution, as the localization 
of retail banking in the USA is also, and in particular the result of the US banking regulation5. 
 
Another reason for the lack in cross border lending could lie in the organizational strategies 
adopted by European banks with respect to type of bank they want to become in an integrated 
European banking market: In principle, a bank can either become a Europe-wide universal bank, 
a domestic universal bank, a Europe-wide specialized bank, or a domestic specialized bank. 
According to Marois (1997), the strategies adopted by European banks are diverse and a 
predominant strategy has yet to crystallize. However, the EU deregulatory process sparked two 
phases of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Europe: The first phase took place in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in reaction to the 2nd BD and the second phase took place in the 
second half of the 1990s in anticipation of the EMU (Tourani Rad and van Beek, 1999). As 
Padoa-Schioppa (2000) argues, it is an error to believe that “a single banking industry will only 
emerge when cross-border mergers occur”. However, the pattern of M&As can give us an 
indication about the types of banks operating in the European market.  
                                                          
5 Especially, the McFadden Act, which was in place from 1927 until 1994 explicitly prohibited interstate branching. 
In 1994, the basis for a truly US wide banking system was laid with the adoption of the Riegel-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. 
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From Table 1 note first that the total value of domestic M&As exceeds that of cross-border 
M&As, mainly driven by acquisitions of commercial banks and securities firms. Only for 
insurance companies the value of cross-border M&As exceed the value of domestic M&As. This 
implies that consolidation is still taking place on a national rather than international level. 
Furthermore, for commercial banks and securities firms M&As within Europe are as important 
as other foreign M&As, indicating a global rather than regional consolidation process. Second, 
consolidation within the sector is more common than consolidation across sectors – with 
domestic M&As and to a lesser extend Europe-Non-Europe M&As when the acquirer is a 
securities firm being the only exceptions. This would indicate that most banks in Europe are still 
specialized rather than universal banks. Taken together these findings show that the typical EU 
bank can still be characterized as a specialized domestic bank. Therefore, the result presented 
earlier that most bank activities are still domestic in nature is not surprising6 (Kleimeier 2001). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
2.2. What constitutes an integrated banking market? 
2.2.1.  The non-applicability of the “law of one price” in credit markets 
Quantifying the degree of integration of the retail banking market is not an easy task. The 
Cecchini study advances the hypothesis of price equalization for financial assets within Europe 
as the characteristic of completely integrated markets. This "law of one price" manifests itself in 
financial markets as the interest rate parity. It is well established that under perfect capital 
                                                          
6 It is interesting to note that the only strategy which can be characterised as clearly European is the acquisition 
strategy that insurance company follow within Europe when acquiring banks. This strategy amounts to 13.4% of all 
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mobility the covered interest parity typically holds, but it is more difficult to establish the 
empirical validity of the uncovered interest parity due to exchange rate volatility or exchange 
rate expectations. In the context of retail banking the case for the law of one price is, however, 
not so straightforward. First, the interest rate parity is suggested as parity for interest rates on 
such assets like government bonds, which are close if not perfect substitutes. This is clearly not 
the case for bank assets like consumer credits. Rather, credits are characterized by heterogeneity 
caused by risk differences, cultural influences in bank-client relationship, country-specific 
strategic bank behavior in order to cope with informational imperfections (moral hazard, 
incentive effects etc.), to name just a few. Consequently, one cannot expect the law of one price 
to hold in the strict sense in the consumer credit market. Secondly, there is clearly not (yet) a 
perfect "capital" mobility. As discussed in the previous section, banks are neither reaching out 
for all prospective Eurozone customers, nor are consumers shopping around for credits in the 
whole Eurozone, i.e. retail banking is still localized. Thus, retail interest rates may not as easily 
equalize as suggested by the Cecchini study. Rather, even when they are equalizing but the 
underlying characteristics of credits are different, this may not even be a sign of an integrated 
banking market. Looking simply at interest rate convergence or equalization can therefore be 
profoundly misleading. 
 
2.2.2. Interest rate trends in the Eurozone – Some descriptive statistics 
Despite the reservation we have about the use of the descriptive statistics we report them in 
Table A1 in the appendix and illustrate the (non-) convergence process in Figures 1 to 3. We 
report the following interest rates as obtained from ECB's National Retail Interest Rates 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Intra-European M&As and is the only M&As type for which the intra-European percentage is higher than either the 
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Statistics: mortgage loans to households (N2), consumer loans to households (N3), and the 
lending rate charged to the corporate sector (N4). These rates are available on a monthly basis 
starting in the 1980s with most countries reporting regularly as off 1989 (a more detailed 
description of the data is provided in the appendix).  
 
 FIGURES 1, 2, 3, ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 and 2 show the convergence of interest rates for mortgage rates, consumer lending rates 
and corporate lending rates in both, nominal and real terms. In general, we divide our sample that 
ranges from April 1995 to April 2002 into a pre-EMU period until December 1998 and an EMU 
period thereafter. Clearly, all nominal rates are now closer together then they were in the mid-
1990s. But this can largely be attributed to the effect of macroeconomic factors, in particular the 
single monetary policy. It is also clear that mortgage rates are closer together because the credit 
characteristics across countries are more similar throughout the Eurozone as compared to the 
lending rates charged for the other credit forms that differ more widely in their characteristics (as 
well as in their statistical definition). For example, while Italy had the highest average mortgage 
rate of 11.1 per cent in the pre-EMU phase and Belgium with 6.1 per cent the lowest rate, both 
countries have in the EMU phase the almost identical average rate of about 6 per cent. However, 
as argued before, interest rates need not equalize – and in most cases should not equalize even in 
the presence of an integrated banking market. From the "localized" borrower's point of view, 
however, the real, consumer price inflation-corrected costs of mortgage borrowing still differ 
widely throughout the Eurozone after January 1999, with the highest real cost in France (5.0 per 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
domestic or the non-Europe share. Thus, it appears that a European trend towards ALLFINANZ might be emerging.  
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cent) and the lowest in Ireland (1.2 per cent), mainly because of differences in consumer price 
inflation. As far as consumer and corporate lending rates are concerned, also here the cross-
country differences have become smaller, but they still remain large.  
 
In Figure 3 we show the development of the spreads between retail lending rates and the money 
market rate (as a proxy of the banks’ cost of funding), which could be interpreted as a rough 
proxy for credit market imperfections. A recent study by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) has shown 
that despite the pro-competitive move in European banking through deregulation, the increased 
concentration stemming from the recent wave of bank mergers may have resulted in less 
competitive loan pricing by banks. Our figure is consistent with this assessment and additionally 
shows that spreads differ significantly across countries but also across lending markets with 
spreads for consumer lending typically being the highest. Moreover, as far as convergence 
patterns are concerned, the only clear effect can be found in the mortgage market.   
 
2.2.3. Cointegrated retail banking markets 
Because of the different characteristics of the various (still) national credit instruments (as well 
as the differences in the reported statistics), we propose to base the judgment about the existence 
of a uniform Eurozone retail banking system on the existence of cointegration among national 
credit markets in Europe. This concept realizes that although full equalization cannot be 
expected, the concept of market integration requires that interest rates should exhibit a certain 
long-run equilibrium relationship. Thus, we do not require that the national interest rate of a 
country (Lnat) should equal the interest rate in the remaining Eurozone (LEU) as it would be 
required by the law of one price shown in equation (1): 
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(1) L nat = LEU 
 
Rather, we accept as a possible long run relationship that the rates may differ from each other 
such that: 
 
(2) Lnat= a + b LEU  
 
In the long-run, equation (2) can be interpreted as a relationship reflecting the existence of a 
financial system with “structural trends and systematic disturbances in banking [that] cut across 
state borders”7 while in the short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship are 
possible. This equation could in principle be estimated by means of regression analysis. 
However, since interest rates typically follow a random walk one may obtain spurious results 
from regression analysis. To establish that there exists a certain long-term relationship one 
therefore has to undertake a cointegration analysis. If cointegration is found, this reflects that 
national interest rates are connected in terms of a long-term relationship as shown in equation 
(2). This retail interest rate link must, however, not necessarily reflect banking market integration 
in the sense of arbitrage as suggested by Cecchini. Rather, in the short-run deviations from this 
long-run equilibrium can be corrected over time by one or more of the following three 
mechanisms: 
• An international arbitrage (cross-border lending) process where banks increasingly shift their 
lending activities to countries where lending rates are the highest while consumers borrow in 
low interest rate countries.  
                                                          
7 For this sentence we have used the words of Padoa-Schioppa (2000) with which he refers to the localized US 
financial system that is commonly viewed as integrated. 
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• When money market rates equalize by means of an international arbitrage process such 
changes will have an impact on lending rates via domestic competition that ties lending and 
borrowing rates together (interest rate pass-through). 
• Increased (international) competition, or the threat of it as suggested by the theory of 
contestable markets will help to harmonies the pricing behavior of banks and thus lead to a 
harmonization of retail prices. 
 
In the context of our study, we apply cointegration methodology closely based on the approach 
promoted by Engle and Granger (1987), which proceeds in three steps. First the time series must 
proven to be unit roots. Only then the cointegration vector can be estimated. Finally, once 
cointegration has been established, the corresponding error correction model will be estimated.  
 
In order to establish whether the interest rates are unit roots, or I(1), two test statistics, a t-
statistic and an F-statistic, will be employed based on regressions on levels as well as first 
differences of the underlying series. Both include next to lagged observations of the lending rate 
L in question also a trend variable T: 
 
(3.1) ∆Lt = η0 + η1 Lt-1 + η2 ∆Lt-1 + η3 T + εt    
(3.2) ∆2Lt = η0 + η1 ∆Lt-1 + η2 ∆2Lt-1  + η3 T + εt  
 
The null hypothesis states that the series follow random walks. For the t-statistic, this 
corresponds to a null hypothesis of H0: η1 = 0 and for the F-statistic to a null hypothesis of H0: 
η1 = η3 = 0. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk if the calculated t or F values 
 13
are smaller in absolute terms than the critical values. Thus, as a precondition for cointegration, 
we have to accept the null hypotheses for equation (3.1.) but reject them for equation (3.2). As 
shown in Table A2 in the appendix the pre-condition that the time series are integrated of the 
order 1 is generally fulfilled. For nominal and real lending rates, there is evidence for I(0) or I(2) 
for only 10% of the series.  
 
Once the I(1) characteristic has been established, cointegration testing can commence starting 
with estimating the cointegration regression using the national lending rate Lnat for the individual 
country as the dependent variable and the weighted average rate for the remaining EU countries 
LEU as the independent variable: 
 
(4) L nat,t = a + b LEU,t + ut 
 
A first cointegration testing procedure relies on the Durbin-Watson statistics (DW). The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected when the calculated DW values resulting from the 
regression of equation (4) are larger than the critical values.  As Engle and Granger point out, the 
Durbin-Watson test can be used as a good but only approximate indicator for cointegration and 
should be followed by a more specific testing procedure such as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The Dickey-Fuller test is based on the residuals of the 
cointegration regression 
 
(5) ∆ût =  −δ0 ût-1 + εt 
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where the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient -δ0  provides an indication regarding the 
cointegration of the two series. In particular, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected when the t-statistic is larger in absolute value than the critical value. 
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is obtained in a two-step procedure from the regression 
 
(6) ∆ût =  −δ0  ût-1 + ∑
=
4
1i
δι  ∆ût-i + εt 
 
In the first step equation (6) is estimated including all 4 lags of ∆ût-i. In the second step, equation 
(6) is re-estimated including only the significant lags of ∆ût-i from step 1. Now, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected when the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient 
−δ0 is larger in absolute value than the critical value. 
 
Once the existence of a long-run relationship, i.e. cointegration is established, one can 
investigate the short-run dynamics of interest rates by estimating the corresponding error 
correction model (ECM). This model will provide an estimate of the speed of adjustment, with 
which the system returns back to the long-run equilibrium. To find the correct specification of 
the ECM, first, an unrestricted vector autoregression (UVAR) is estimated based on the 
regression 
 
(7) ∆Lnat,t= λ0 + λ1 Lnat,t-1 + λ2 LEU,t-1 + ∑
=
4
1i
λnati ∆Lnat,t-i  + ∑
=
4
1i
λEUi ∆LEU,t-i + εt 
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From this regression, the significant lagged first differences of the exogenous and endogenous 
variables are identified and included in the final ECM in combination with any error correction 
terms (ECT) obtained from the estimated errors ût-1 of the cointegration regression 
 
(8) ∆Lnat,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1 ût-1 + ∑
=
4
1i
ϕnati ∆Lnat,t-i  + ∑
=
4
1i
ϕEUi ∆LEU,t-i + εt 
 
The estimated coefficient ϕ1 of the ECT measures the speed of adjustment. For example, an 
estimated ϕ1 of -0.2 indicates that if there is a shock to the national lending rate Lnat,t, which 
raises its value relative to the equilibrium relationship to the cointegrated EU-wide lending rate 
LEU,t, then one fifth of the divergence is eliminated in the following period. 
 
In the remainder of the study, we will investigate the presence or non-presence of such a long-
term relationship among Eurozone retail banking markets and inquire into the mechanisms that 
eventually bind national interest rates together. However, given the countries and time periods, 
which are the focus of our study, it is very well possible that the introduction of the single 
currency has brought about structural changes in the cointegration relationship. In order to detect 
whether any such structural changes are present and if so, at what time they occur, we conduct a 
structural break analysis of the cointegration regression. In particular, we estimate a rolling 
Chow test, which implies the following procedure: First, the cointegration regression of equation 
(4) is estimated for the full sample ranging from April 1995 to April 2002. However, in the 
presence of a structural break, the DW, DF, and ADF cointegration tests have low power, i.e. the 
rejection frequency of the ADF test is clearly reduced (e.g. Gregory et.al., 1996). Thus, in a 
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second step, the cointegration vector is tested for structural breaks such that H0: at1 = at2 and bt1 
= bt2 with sub-samples t1 = 1 to k and t2 = k+1 to T. If k, the time of the break is known, the two 
samples t1 and t2 are clearly identified and a standard Chow test can be conducted. In our case, 
we consider a break to be likely around January 1999, but the exact timing of the break -if indeed 
there is any- is not known. Thus, rather than using a standard Chow test, a supremum F (supF) 
test is calculated. This test was first proposed by Quandt (1960) and has more recently been the 
focus of various studies (e.g. Andrews 1993, Diebold and Chen 1996, Hansen 1992). In our 
single equation model, the supF test can be found by conducting a series of Chow tests. In 
particular, Chow tests are conducted for a series of different break points k, which move through 
the mid-80% of the sample. SupF equals the largest Chow F-statistic and is compared to critical 
values as reported by Hansen (1992). Depending on the model, the number of observations, etc, 
any estimated supF test statistic larger than approximately 15 will allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural break. Furthermore, the sequence of F-statistics can give an indication 
about the timing of the break. 
 
Table 2 reports the test statistics and the timing of our structural break test that we have been 
conducting for the cointegration relationship for both nominal and real lending rates.8 The first 
striking result is that for nominal interest rates almost all long-run relationships show evidence in 
favor of a structural break around the time of the introduction of the single currency. This 
evidence seems to be in line with the view that a single currency had a major impact on the 
unification of a banking system. For real interest rates we often find structural breaks occurring 
earlier. This may be interpreted as the result of the convergence process in terms of inflation 
 17
rates that happened in the mid 1990s9. Consequently, we generally divide the sample into a pre-
EMU sub-period and an EMU sub-period. As can be seen the pre-EMU period is not always free 
of structural breaks but for the sake of comparability we have chosen the 1995 to 1998 period. 
For the EMU period, we estimate the cointegration vector over both, the whole EMU period and 
over a shorter post-break period when appropriate.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.  IS A UNIFIED EUROPEAN RETAIL BANKING MARKET EMERGING? NO, (MAYBE) NO, AND 
MAYBE (YES)! 
Our judgment on the emergence of a uniform European banking system will in the following be 
based on the result of the proposed cointegration analysis that we performed for all retail lending 
rates for the Eurozone countries in both, nominal and real terms. While we are confident that the 
methodology we propose is helpful in monitoring the progress towards an integrated European 
banking market, the existing database is still the major obstacle for making to strict judgments at 
the moment, for three reasons: First, there is no sufficiently harmonized data on credit and in 
particular consumer credit (Diez Guardia 2000). This problem can and should be addressed in 
the future, but in the meantime the data provided by the ECB can be used as a first proxy. 
Secondly, the time period for which data for all countries are available simultaneously is very 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Figure A1 and A2 in the appendix visualize the results. Typically the peaks in the figures represent the presence 
and timing of the structural break, provided the F-statistics value exceeds the critical value. 
9 To illustrate this point consider fully integrated real interest rates with the real interest rates in two countries both 
being 5 percent (and thereafter varying driven by the same structural trends). With an expected inflation rate of 2 
percent in both countries, the nominal rate would be 7 percent. Now consider one country starting from an inflation 
rate expectation of 6 percent, which would imply a nominal interest rate of 11 percent. If now inflation and 
subsequently inflation expectations would converge to 2 percent, the nominal interest rate in the high-inflation 
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limited. And third, the introduction of the single currency has brought about structural changes 
that limit the available database further. In particular, we find that the introduction of the single 
currency in 1999 has sufficiently shaken up the structural relationship to base judgment on the 
current state of integration only on data relating to the EMU phase. This reduces the database 
from which to derive judgments to three and a half years, which obviously limits the power of 
the statistical work. The only way to avoid this reduction would be to include past data that may 
not reflect to current state of integration. Given the data limitation, the results of the study will 
have to be interpreted with caution, but are, however, in our view still very valuable. An earlier 
study conducted by the authors (Kleimeier and Sander 2002) using a two years estimation 
horizon is thus extended here. As we will show, most of our earlier results are remaining valid, 
thus suggesting a certain robustness of the estimates. Where important differences between the 
current and the earlier estimates appear we will comment on them explicitly. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the results of the cointegration analysis for nominal interest rates, Figure 5 for 
real interest rates. The figures are summarizing the empirical testing for which the details are 
made available in Table 3 and A3 in the appendix. Only for countries and sample or sub-sample 
periods where bars are shown, a cointegration relationship could be established. The absence of a 
bar therefore indicates that we do not find any evidence of cointegration of these countries’ 
lending markets with the corresponding Eurozone lending market (countries for which data are 
not available are clearly indicated with an N.A.). The height of the bars then simply indicates 
how fast the national rates are returning to the long-term equilibrium. It should be noted, 
however, that in some cases despite the fact that cointegration has been accepted in the test 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
country would decrease and, consequently, nominal interest rates would not be cointegrated during the inflation 
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procedures the error-correction mechanism was not found to be statistically significant at an at 
least 10 per cent confidence level. In such cases striped bars are being used. Moreover, for the 
EMU period in a number of countries structural breaks occur after January 1999 – in some cases 
as late as June 2001, thus limiting the reliability of the estimates. Whenever we report the results 
for a post-break EMU period, the break point is indicated above the bar as a reminder to the 
above-mentioned limitations. Do we then find evidence for a uniform European retail banking 
market? The brief answers are: No for mortgages, maybe no for consumer lending, and maybe 
yes for corporate lending. Or to go into more detail: 
1. As argued earlier, judgments about market integration based on interest rate convergence can 
be misleading. For example, nominal European mortgage rates are converging because they 
are by and large following the money market rate developments. But as shown in our results 
here they do not (yet) exhibit a long-term equilibrium relationship in many cases.  
2. Regarding nominal mortgage lending rates, we find only very limited evidence in favor of 
cointegration. The only EMU-member country that exhibits cointegration over the whole 
estimation horizon is France10 whereas for Belgium cointegration is only present in a post-
break period starting in May 1999. The latter result emerged only when using the extended 
sample until April 2002. For Germany and the Netherlands cointegration is only present in 
the pre-EMU period and – surprisingly – not in the EMU period. Interestingly, for non-EMU 
countries Sweden11 and the UK cointegration can be found. Again, particularly the post-
break period for these countries suffers from a very short estimation horizon so that the 
results should be interpreted with care. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
convergence process. 
10 Recall, however, that French data were only available with a quarterly frequency thus limiting the reliability of 
this result. 
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3. While there is very little to almost no evidence for cointegration in mortgage markets in 
nominal terms, there is somewhat more evidence for cointegration for nominal consumer 
rates. For the EMU-members France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain we find a 
statistically significant adjustment process towards a long-term equilibrium relationship, 
which is generally stronger or just only becoming statistically significant in the EMU-period 
and in particular in the shorter post-break periods. A similar observation holds true for the 
non-EMU member Sweden and UK, possibly suggesting that the observed tendencies reflect 
probably the impact of the generally declining level of interest rates over the sample period 
which may or may be not followed smoothly by consumer lending rates. This suggests that 
the pass-through mechanism in the various countries may play an important role in producing 
these statistical artifacts.  While we find that our earlier conclusion of “no” evidence for 
cointegration in consumer lending must be slightly modified into a weaker “maybe no”, the 
fact that with the exemption of Portugal and Spain the error correction mechanism exhibits 
only a slow speed of adjustment which points to still weakly linked lending markets. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the single currency may already show its first effect here.   
4. For the corporate sector the evidence is pointing to a number of cases where nominal 
cointegration could be established in particular in the EMU phase. It can also be observed 
that the ECT-coefficients are often higher than in the other markets, eventually pointing to 
the more important role of competition (direct vs. indirect finance etc.) in this sector. It is 
interesting to note that in particular those EMU countries who have often been dubbed as 
“non-core EMU” such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain may have been most effected by 
integration efforts as we find here a significant and high speed of adjustment toward the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Note that for Sweden also only quarterly data are available. 
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long-run equilibrium relationship in the EMU period. However, it is also striking that for 
core-EMU countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands we were not 
(anymore) able to detect evidence for cointegration in the EMU period. Again, the 
particularities of the pass-through process in the latter four countries could be potential 
suspects for explaining this result, such as a close bank-firm relationship, which eventually 
limits the flexibility of lending rates. 
5. In real (inflation-corrected) terms there is some more evidence in favor of cointegration in 
mortgage rates despite the fact that real mortgage rate diverge more than nominal ones. For 
the first two years of the EMU our earlier study has found cointegration for Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, and in Spain. This already more pronounced trend towards 
cointegration in the EMU is reinforced in the extended sample (also by using an explicit 
post-break period), with Austria and the Netherlands exhibiting now a more forceful error-
correction mechanism, while cointegration and a significant ECT could be found now for 
Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy. Note however, that some EMU members are either not 
exhibiting an ECM anymore (Finland, Germany, Portugal) or that the ECT is showing lower 
values (Spain). Given the role of inflation expectations for the determination for real 
mortgage rates, the evidence for or against cointegration of real mortgage rates may thus 
reflect the convergence or non-convergence of inflation expectations in the Eurozone. From 
the point of view of the individual borrower the almost non-existence of nominal co-
integration suggests unexploited arbitrage possibilities and as such a lack of integration. 
6. For real consumer lending rates, however, we have found in our earlier study that evidence 
for cointegration was less pronounced than for real mortgage rates. The mortgage rate results 
may have reflected the fact that borrowers extensively compare prices nationally, that the 
 
 
 22
national markets are more competitive and that inflation expectations play an important role 
in the long-term oriented mortgage market. In consumer lending, the sketchier evidence for 
cointegration may have pointed to a less competitive environment often characterized by 
high switching costs. However, after extending the sample period, the evidence for 
cointegration has improved, suggesting the potentially unifying role of a common monetary 
policy. Note, however, that a statistically significant structural break occurred for a number 
of countries relatively late after the introduction of the single currency thus limiting the 
reliability of this finding. 
7. The strongest results for cointegration in real borrowing costs can be found for corporate 
rates. For 10 out of 12 countries we find a significant error correction mechanism for the 
EMU period.  
 
In sum, we find (almost) no evidence for a uniform banking market for mortgages. The picture 
differs, however, if one turns from nominal to real lending rates. Here mortgage rates appear to 
be more cointegrated, i.e. households' real cost of mortgage borrowing are more likely to follow 
similar structural trends in the Eurozone. The evidence for cointegration in consumer credits is 
only somewhat better, again slightly more so for real than for nominal rates. Our conclusion is 
therefore also a “maybe no”. But we do find quite some evidence for more unified corporate 
lending in the EMU phase from nominal as well as real rate analysis. A "maybe yes" might 
therefore be justified, in particular in the EMU phase. Our “no, (maybe) no, and maybe (yes)” 
conclusion is, however, subject to three reservations. First, and as mentioned before, our sample 
size is for obvious reasons quite short for the EMU period thus limiting the validity of 
conclusions. It is, however, reassuring, that our result presented here, are very much validating 
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the results of our earlier study. Second, by extending the sample we are also able to confirm our 
earlier observation that as the effects of the single currency unfold, the so far rather sketchy 
evidence for integration increases. Finally and most importantly, equating evidence in favor of 
cointegration with integrated markets can be misleading. Cointegration in banking may not be 
brought about by cross-border lending, mergers and acquisitions, or international arbitrage. 
Rather, the statistical evidence of cointegration under the condition of a single monetary policy 
may simply reflect a smooth and homogeneous pass-through of monetary policy rate changes 
onto lending rates in all EMU member. The latter phenomenon will be investigated in the 
following section.  
 
TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. PASS-THROUGH OF INTEREST RATES CHANGES TO LENDING RATES: 
A STILL SEGMENTED EUROZONE BANKING MARKET? 
Evidence for cointegration in lending markets can be produced by three mechanisms: arbitrage, 
(threat of) international competition, and a uniform monetary policy impact on lending rates. 
Based on the few cases in which we found cointegration one cannot directly identify that 
arbitrage and competition are the driving mechanisms. In this case, retail interest rates could in 
principle follow the same time pattern if banks in the different Eurozone countries would pass 
changes in policy-related interest rates smoothly and with the same speed onto lending rates. On 
the other hand, the cases in which we did not find cointegration indicate not only a lack of 
arbitrage and international competition but also an ineffective and/or heterogeneous monetary 
policy impact on lending rates. An ineffective pass-through of interest rates could be interpreted 
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as pointing to a high degree of imperfect competition in retail banking (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994). A heterogeneous pass-through could be interpreted as limited institutional convergence in 
Eurozone banking (Kleimeier and Sander 2000, Sander and Kleimeier 2002). Thus, the 
investigation of the limitations and differences in the pass-through of interest rates in the 
Eurozone can provide indirect evidence about forces driving or limiting the emergence of a 
unified Eurozone retail banking market. 
 
4.1. Pass-Through Methodology 
Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), a growing literature is discussing the response of 
lending rates to monetary policy impulses as an important part of the monetary transmission 
process. These approaches typically model the transmission process in a dynamic model for the 
lending rate such as  
 
ttMtLt MLL εβββ +++= −11)9(  
 
where Lt and Mt are the national lending and money market rates, respectively (where we omit 
the subscript ‘nat’ because only national lending rates are part of the pass-through analysis and a 
distinction between national and EU-wide lending rates is not required in this context). The 
estimated coefficient ßM is the impact multiplier. A value of less than 1 indicates sluggish 
adjustment of lending rates to money market rates, also known as lending rate stickiness12. This 
leads to a partial adjustment process over time towards a long-run equilibrium. In the long run 
                                                          
12 The study by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) confirms that increases in concentration in the Eurozone banking 
sector can make the transmission of monetary policy to lending rates more sluggish. 
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when the lending rate reaches its steady state value for any given value of the money market rate, 
i.e. Lt-1 equals Lt, equation (9) takes the form of:  
 
ttt uML ++= θθ0)10(  
 
Cottarelli and Kouralis (1994) argue that this formulation is consistent with the monopolistic 
competition model relating the lending rate to the money market rate. If θ is equal to one, we 
speak of a full pass-through in the long-run, while the parameter θ0 reflects then the mark-up 
over costs in the pricing policies of the banks.  
 
We estimate a slightly revised version of Cottarelli and Kouralis (1994) given by  
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k* and n* are defined as the model’s optimal lag-length which is determined by the minimum 
AIC criteria for models with up to 4 lags. Note that for k=1 and n=0 this model is equivalent to 
the model of equation (9). Similar to the model of equation (9), the estimated coefficient 2βˆ is the 
impact multiplier. The long-term multiplier can be calculated from (11) as  
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and the long run equation therefore has again the form of  
 
ttt uML ++= θθ0)13(  
 
It is widely accepted that the time series for interest rates typically exhibit an I(1) property, that 
is unit root tests can not reject the null hypothesis of a random walk. Consequently, pass-through 
models like equation (11) are regularly estimated in first differences to avoid spurious regression 
problems.  
 
Next to the standard pass-through specification, we propose to base pass-through measurement 
on a well specified error correction model that explicitly incorporates the long-run relationship 
between lending and money market rates provided the series are cointegrated13.  
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where ECT contains the estimated residuals ût-1 from the long-run equilibrium relationship 
defined by equation (13), provided such a relationship can be established by cointegration testing 
procedures corresponding to those described in section 2.2.3.  
 
This formulation has a number of advantages over the standard pass-through model of equation 
(11). First, as the long-run multiplier can directly be obtained from the co-integrating regression 
(13). Second, we can directly obtain the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium 
                                                          
13 For details on the methodology see Sander and Kleimeier (2002). 
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via the estimated coefficient of the ECT in equation (14). Third, this error correction 
specification allows us to analyze a variety of adjustment mechanisms – including the symmetric 
adjustment of the Engle-Granger cointegration methodology but also alternative asymmetric 
adjustment – thus showing more openly the differences in the financial part of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Moreover, using models with asymmetries allows us to detect 
cointegration in cases where there are asymmetries and where the Engle-Granger methodology 
would thus fail to detect cointegration. Finally, only in cases where no cointegration is present in 
the data the standard pass-through model is appropriate. 
 
In particular, we are considering here five different specifications for asymmetric adjustment of 
interest rates. The first model we consider is the threshold autoregressive model (TAR0) 
developed by Tong (1983). The model makes a distinction whether the explained interest rate 
(lending rate in our case) is above or below its equilibrium level. Thus, the TAR0 allows for 
asymmetric adjustment depending on the state of equilibrium-deviation. For example, if the 
money market rate decreases without an immediate adjustment in the lending rate, we obtain a 
positive realization of the error term ut. When in this case the autoregressive decay is faster than 
in the case of money market rate increases, then the lending rate adjustment is faster downward 
than upward. An appropriate test procedure is to set a Heaviside indicator It for different states of 
ût-1. 
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Using this definition, we test for cointegration by estimating equation (16), which represents a 
modification of the ADF test. The null of no cointegration is rejected if the estimated F-statistic 
for H0: ρ1 = ρ2=0 based on critical values provided by Enders and Siklos (2000). 
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The optimal lag length m* is determined via the minimum AIC criteria for models with up to 4 
lags. When cointegration is established, an F-test for equality of ρ1 and ρ2 indicates the presence 
of asymmetry. 
 
The next model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR0 in the sense that the threshold that was 
formerly implicitly set at zero is now allowed to deviate from that value. The rational behind 
such a non-zero threshold is that one or both variables may only adjust to a dis-equilibrium once 
it exceeds a certain minimum deviation in one direction. For example, the lending rate will adjust 
fast only when out of an equilibrium situation the money market rate drops in a way that the 
deviation from equilibrium exceeds an optimal threshold of, say, 0.5 percentage points. For 
lower deviations or increases in the money market rate, adjustment takes place at a significantly 
slower pace. Now the Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (16)14 is defined as 
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14 For both, the TAR* and the following B-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR0 specification is 
used. 
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In accordance with Chan’s (1993), the optimal threshold a0* is found by searching over the mid-
80% of the distribution of ût and selecting the model for which the residual sum of squares is 
minimized. Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above described F-tests. 
 
The third variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*), which defines the Heaviside indicator as  
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while equation (16) has to be modified to 
 
t
m
i
ititj
j
jt uuIu ερρ +∆+=∆ ∑∑
=
−+−
=
*
1
31
3
1
ˆˆˆ)19(  
 
Procedures for optimal lag length m* and optimal threshold a0* are corresponding to those of the 
TAR* and the F-tests for cointegration and asymmetry are applied to all three coefficient ρj. 
Such a model has often been applied in particular to model interest rate cointegration where 
infrequent and discrete adjustments in the rates occur (Balke and Fomby 1997, Baum and 
Karasulu 1998). For example, if deviations from equilibrium are small and will therefore not lead 
to an adjustment of the dependent interest rate, one may find no cointegration within a narrow 
band bordered by a0* and –a0* while outside this band cointegration and thus an error correction 
mechanism may be present. In the context of our study, such behavior could be related to the 
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”menu-cost” argument of lending rate stickiness such that banks only adjust lending rates when 
deviations are sufficiently large. However, if it would happen that inside the band cointegration 
is found but not outside, this could indicate that banks implicitly insure their customers against 
excessive deviations from equilibrium by smoothing the response of the lending rate. 
 
In the TAR models the autoregressive decay always depends on the degree of deviation from 
equilibrium. One could also image situations where the adjustment speed depends on how fast 
the rates move away from or towards equilibrium. Enders and Granger (1998) therefore propose 
a momentum threshold autoregressive model (M-TAR) where the Heaviside indicator depends as 
follows on the change in error correction term, ∆ût: 
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Similar to the TAR0 and TAR* specifications, the threshold in the M-TAR can either be set at 
zero leading to the M-TAR0 specification or be optimized at a0* leading to the M-TAR* 
specification. Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceed based on equation (16) above. The 
M-TAR models have successfully been applied to the term structure of interest rates by Enders 
and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2000). According to the latter authors, M-TAR 
adjustment can be especially useful when decision makers (in our case banks) are viewed as 
attempting to smooth out large changes in a series. 
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Based on the cointegration testing we selected the appropriate model for analyzing the pass-
through of interest rates. In the case where no cointegration was found, we use the standard pass-
through model (STD). This can be done by estimating the error correction model of equation 
(14) with βECT set to zero. For this as well as for all other specifications of equation (14), we 
have chosen an optimal lag length k* and n* for lending and money market rates, respectively, 
by applying the minimum AIC criteria for all models with up to 4 lags in either rate. 
Consequently, in the STD model the impact multiplier is given by the estimated coefficient 2βˆ  
and the long-run multiplier θ is calculated according to equation (12).  
 
When cointegration was found, the long-run multiplier θ is directly obtained from the co-
integrating regression (13) while again the impact multiplier is 2βˆ  obtained from the appropriate 
specification of equation (14). The error correction mechanism itself depends on the optimal 
model. In the case of the symmetric cointegration model (SYM), the ECT is equal to the 
estimated residuals of the co-integrating regression. βECT is therefore estimating the speed of a 
symmetric adjustment process towards a long-run equilibrium. In the models with asymmetric 
adjustment, βECT and the ECTs are 2-dimensional or, in the case of the B-TAR*, 3-dimentional 
vectors which give the speed of adjustment depending on the definition of the ECTs of equations 
(15), (17), (18), or (20), respectively. Furthermore, where appropriate, the value of the optimal 
threshold a0* is reported. 
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4.2. Evidence on Pass-Through in the Eurozone 
In investigating the pass-through in the Eurozone we estimate both the standard pass-through 
model of equation (11) as well as the well-specified error correction model for cases when 
lending and money market rates are cointegrated. Table 4 gives the details of the pass-through 
model selection. In case that neither symmetric nor asymmetric cointegration could be 
established, the standard pass-through model will be selected. If we find evidence for 
asymmetric cointegration, the TAR-type model that best fits the data based on the AIC criteria is 
chosen. These models are able to detect cointegration under condition of asymmetry and 
threshold behavior - cointegration that would otherwise remain undetected and could lead to a 
premature conclusion of limited competition in the banking sector. However, if the test statistics 
lead to a rejection of the asymmetry cointegration hypothesis, the symmetric error correction 
pass-through model is considered, cointegration provided. Based on this selection, the estimates 
of the pass-through models are given in Table 5 and visualized in Figures 6 and 7.  
 
TABLE 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Among the most important results are: 
1. The impact multipliers are in most cases far below 1 indicating a limited pass-through of 
interest rate changes typically averaging between 0.3 for mortgage rates and slightly above 
0.4 for consumer and corporate lending rates. 
2. Even in the long run, the pass-through is far from perfect – that is, we do not always find a 
full pass-through. However, the long-run pass-through works best in corporate lending rates. 
This result corresponds to our findings in the cointegration analysis and points to the fact that 
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next to a lack of cross-border lending a limited interest rate pass-through is the second cause 
for the lack of integration. 
3. Comparing the size of the impact multipliers over time shows evidence for an increase in 5 
out of 12 countries for mortgage rates. In the EMU period therefore, the average impact 
multiplier increased on average from 0.24 to 0.35. Regarding consumer lending rates, it 
appears that the average value of the impact multipliers has decreased, however, this is 
compensated by an increased in the speed of adjustment as measured by the ECT 
coefficients. Regarding corporate lending rates, there is a slight increase of the average 
impact multiplier from 0.41 to 0.42, but again supported by an additional increase in the 
average speed of adjustment, which among all rates shows the highest values. Again, this 
result which was already documented in our earlier study indicates that the pass-through 
mechanism has become faster after January 1999, a result also recently confirmed by an ECB 
study (de Bondt, 2002). 
4. For all three rates, it is also evident from Figures 6 and 7 that the pass-through mechanism 
differs widely across countries in both, the short-run and the long-run, thus explaining not 
only the lack of integration but also the increasing evidence for cointegration in the presence 
of a single monetary policy. For example, during the pre-EMU period the heterogeneity as 
measured by the standard deviation of the long-term multipliers is the highest in consumer 
lending (0.56) followed by mortgage (0.44) and corporate lending (0.28). When moving into 
the EMU period, however, we find some evidence for a more homogeneous pass-through for 
mortgages and consumer lending as standard deviations fall to 0.33 and 0.28, respectively. 
Again, this confirms our interpretation that an efficient and uniform pass-through process is 
the main force behind the cointegration evidence. 
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5. The important novelty of our extended model is the analysis of the different nature of the 
adjustment process. The results show that there is no predominant model that fits all lending 
markets and countries. Rather, we find that in some cases lending rates are adjusting only 
when rates are sufficiently far from the equilibrium – that is, surpassing a certain threshold. 
In other cases, adjustment is differing when rates are moving upward or downward, or away 
or towards the equilibrium. In yet another case, adjustment takes place only when there is a 
fast and large movement away from equilibrium. For example looking to the EMU period, in 
corporate lending we find in 8 out of 12 cases either a symmetric adjustment or standard 
process. Only in Belgium, France, Portugal, and non-EMU member Sweden an asymmetric 
threshold adjustment model seems to be more adequate. For Sweden, however, the speed of 
adjustment could not be found significant. The results point to the fact that banks shields at 
least partially their corporate customers from rapid changes in interest rates. Turning now to 
EMU-period consumer lending rates we find no error correction mechanism in Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, a symmetric one in Austria, France, Portugal, Sweden, an asymmetric 
band adjustment in Spain, and a momentum asymmetric threshold adjustment in Denmark, 
Finland, and the UK. Again for EMU period, mortgage rates in most countries exhibit a 
standard pass-through (7 of 13) or a symmetric one (5 of 13). The only exception is France 
where a momentum threshold adjustment model seems to provide the best fit, indicating that 
banks only adjust lending rates when changes are fast and sufficiently large. This finding is 
consistent with the lack of cointegration in the mortgage market as such sluggish and 
differential adjustments can explain the lack of a common mortgage rate behavior in Europe.  
 
FIGURE 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
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Summing up, the transmission process from money market interest rates to lending rates in the 
Eurozone exhibits strong national characteristics, which are rooted in the specific features of the 
national finance and banking systems. While there is some evidence for the emergence of a 
smoother pass-through process in the recent EMU years, it is still a far way from calling it a 
uniform banking system. These results are in line with the findings of a recent ECB study that 
suggests “that current ‘country asymmetries’ in response of bank rates to monetary policy should 
decrease over time by virtue of the implementation of the single monetary policy” (Mojon 
2000).15 Overall, it appears that three factors are simultaneously important for creating a uniform 
retail banking market in the Eurozone: The first factor is the potential impact of the single 
currency as suggested above. Secondly, further harmonization of national legislation in particular 
in the area of consumer credit where harmonization accomplished so far is limited (Diez Guardia 
2000). Along similar lines, national differences in taxation also go some way in explaining the 
lack of arbitrage, in particular for mortgage lending. Thirdly, additional regulatory efforts and 
pro-competition measures are needed to promote a smooth and more uniform pass-through of 
monetary policy changes. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study provides new evidence on the emergence of unified European retail banking market. 
The first point we stress is that the empirical artifact of converging nominal and real lending 
rates cannot simply be read as a sign for an integrating retail banking market. Such rates follow - 
often with considerable delay - the changes in central bank-determined interest rates, that is, 
convergence of lending rates could be the consequence of convergence of monetary policy and 
                                                          
15 See also de Bondt (2002) who reports a smoother pass-through mechanism in the Eurozone after January 1999. 
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not of market integration. Secondly, we therefore suggest to base judgment on the existence of a 
uniform banking market on a cointegration analysis. Doing so, we find very limited evidence for 
cointegration in particular before January 1, 1999, that is the introduction of the single currency. 
The 2nd BD and other regulation efforts in order to create a single lending market appear to have 
been of a limited effect in this respect. Third, we find that the relationship of national lending 
markets with the remaining Eurozone lending markets exhibits strong signs of structural changes 
that have come along with the introduction of the single currency on January 1, 1999. This result 
should not be underestimated as it indicates that Eurozone credit markets are changing 
dramatically. Forth, we provide a first picture of the emerging (uniform) Eurozone banking 
market based on the data available so far. However, our results based now on more than three 
years experience with the single currency are confirming the findings of our earlier study, thus 
pointing to a certain level of robustness of the proposition that the Euro has the potential to unify 
financial markets. We found, fifth, that there are some tendencies for a more uniform corporate 
lending market, while consumer and mortgage lending markets are still more fragmented. Sixth, 
we identify three driving forces towards a uniform banking market: Cross border borrowing and 
lending (arbitrage), a national and international retail banking environment, and a smooth and 
uniform pass-through of interest rate changes onto lending rates. Regarding the first point, 
lending is still a very much localized activity and may eventually remain so. For an effective 
arbitrage process a much higher level of harmonization is needed, in particular in the field of 
consumer credit. If, however, cross-border lending is limited this lack of internationalization of 
lending could have been healed by a competitive behavior of loan pricing. On the one hand, 
increased competition would decrease lending spreads. Our descriptive analysis of interest rate 
spreads has delivered no clear evidence in favor of the increased competition hypothesis and is in 
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line with the more sophisticated empirical work by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001). On the other 
hand, more competition should lead to a smoother pass-through of monetary policy changes onto 
borrowers in particular with respect to lending to the corporate sector. Consequently, improving 
the competitive environment in retail banking could not only benefit the borrowers a lot but also 
help to unify the Eurozone retail banking market.  
 
Integrating financial markets legally is in itself not a guarantee that a competitive and more 
uniform retail lending markets will be established throughout the Eurozone. It is in this context 
that a recent “report by the Economic and Financial Committee on EU Financial Integration” 
states that “[o]nly if integration results in a genuine increase in the level of competition will 
efficiency gains translate into lower capital cost for borrowers ...” (Economic and Financial 
Committee 2002:3). The committee therefore also remarks that “to accompany the transition to 
an integrated financial market, the competent competition authorities must be fully prepared to 
respond to the evolving structure of the EU’s financial markets, including by addressing 
uncompetitive structures and arrangements resulting from the inheritance of national markets in 
financial services.” (Economic and Financial Committee 2002:22). 
 
However, our results also suggest that the introduction of the single currency already had and 
will most likely continue to have an important impact on the emergence of a single Eurozone 
retail banking market. In what direction these developments will go, needs to be monitored 
closely for all different retail lending products in order to obtain the benefits promised earlier 
with the single market initiative as well as to promote the smooth functioning of the single 
monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX – DATA SOURCES 
Our study mainly relies on monthly national retail interest rates that have been obtained from 
ECB. The ECB collects three consumer lending rates: overdrafts on cash accounts (series N1), 
mortgage loans to households (series N2), and consumer loans to households (series N3). As the 
series N1 is only available for France and Ireland, we are forced to focus on the remaining series 
N2 and N3. With regards to corporate lending rates we use the series N4 ‘short-term loans to 
enterprises’. These series are available for the EMU member countries Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain and for 
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as non-EMU EU countries. The series N4 for 
Denmark and N3 for Sweden and Denmark are available from the ECB’s publication “Selected 
retail interest rates from the non-Euro area EU countries. Note, however, that the following 
series are missing: N2 for Denmark, N3 for Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands, N4 for Finland 
and the UK. Furthermore, the following series are only available as quarterly data: N2 for France 
and Sweden, N3 for Denmark, France and Sweden, N4 for Denmark and Sweden. In these cases, 
we assume that interest rates are constant during the given quarter and thus convert the quarterly 
to a monthly frequency by filling in the missing values. For the UK and Sweden several different 
N2 series are available and the series 2.3 and 2.1 have been chosen, respectively, as the relevant 
mortgage rate. For the UK several different N3 series are available and the series 3.1 has been 
chosen as the relevant consumer lending rate. For Belgium, Italy, and Portugal several different 
N4 series are available and the series 4.1, 4.1, and 4.2 have been chosen, respectively, as the 
relevant corporate lending rate. Finally, whereas some national series start as early as 1980, data 
for all EMU member countries is available only as of April 1995. Thus we decided to focus on 
the period from April 1995 until April 2002.  
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Based on these nominal interest rate series, real interest rates are calculated by deducting 
inflation rates. Inflation rates are calculated as the percentage change in the consumer price index 
(CPI) which is obtained from the CD-ROM version of the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). From January 1996 until April 2002, a 
harmonized consumer price index (HCPI) as given in the IFS’s line 64H is available for all EU 
countries and has been used. Before January 1996, the national CPI of line 64 is used. 
Exceptions to this rule are the following: For Portugal, national CPI data are used until 
December 1998 and HCPI is used starting January 1999. For Ireland, no CPI data are available. 
Thus, inflation rates are calculated based on wholesale prices until December 1998 and HCPI is 
used starting January 1999. 
 
In order to calculate European weighted averages for the nominal and real interest rate series N2, 
N3, and N4, weights for each country have to be found. These weights should appropriately 
reflect the relative economics importance of the Eurozone countries. We therefore work with the 
OECD (2000) weighting scheme for aggregate measures, which is based on 1995 GDP and 
purchasing power parities. The weights are 0.82 for Austria, 1.05 for Belgium, 0.46 for Finland, 
5.72 for France, 8.33 for Germany, 0.31 for Ireland, 5.49 for Italy, 1.57 for the Netherlands, 0.65 
for Portugal, and 2.84 for Spain. Note that when estimating equation (4), the country under 
investigation is excluded from the European average and the weights are re-scaled to sum up to 
100 per cent. Note that as Greece did not join EMU until January 2001, it has not been included 
in the weighted averages. 
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Finally, money market rates are obtained from line 60b of the CD-ROM version of the IMF’s 
IFS. National rates for EMU member countries are used until December 1998 but due to the 
convergence of money market rates under the single currency, Euro area rates have been used as 
of January 1999. For Greece, national rates are available only from January 1998 to October 
1999. After October 1999, Euro area rates have been used instead. For non-EMU member 
countries, the national rates have been used for the full time period. 
 
This sample selection leads to series without any missing values for all EMU member countries. 
However, the series for the non-EMU member countries show some missing values. In particular 
the following series are not available for the full time period of 4/95 to 4/02: Mortgage lending 
rates (N2): Nominal rates, real rates and spreads for Greece (1/99-4/02), Sweden (1/96-9/01), UK 
(4/95-3/02). Consumer lending rates (N3): Nominal rates, real rates and spreads for Denmark 
(10/95-12/01), Greece (1/99-4/02), Sweden (10/95-9/01). Corporate lending rates (N4): Nominal 
rates, real rates and spreads for Denmark (4/95-12/01), Sweden (4/95-9/01), nominal rates for 
Greece (4/95-4/04) and real rates and spreads for Greece (1/98-4/02). 
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APPENDIX – TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE A1, A2, A3 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE A1, A2 ABOUT HERE 
 43
REFERENCES  
 
Andrews, D.W. K, 1993. Tests for parameter instability and structural change with an unknown 
change point. Econometrica 61, 821--856. 
Balke, N.S., Fomby, T.B., 1997. Threshold cointegration. International Economic Review 38, 
627--645. 
Baum, C.F., Karasulu, M, 1998. Modelling Federal Reserve discount policy. Computational 
Economics 11, 53--70. 
Berger, A.N., Demsetz, R.S.,Strahan, P.E., 1999. The consolidation of the financial services 
industry: Causes, consequences, and implication for the future. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 23, 135--194. 
Bredemeier, S., 1995. Integration within the banking sector, in: Lang, F.P., Ohr, R. (Eds.) 
International Economic Integration, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg., pp. 159--180. 
Chan, K.S., 1993. Consistency and limiting distribution of the least squares estimator of a 
threshold autroregressive model. The Annals of Statistics 21, 520--533. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1988. European economy: The economics of 1992, No. 
35.Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.  
Corvoisier, S.,Gropp, R, 2001. Bank concentration and retail interest rates. ECB working paper 
no. 72. 
Cottarelli, C., Kourelis, A, 1994. Financial structure, bank lending rates, and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. IMF Staff Papers 41, No 4. 
De Bondt, G., 1998. Financial structure: Theories and stylised facts for six EU countries. De 
Economist 146, 271--300. 
 
 
 44
De Bondt, G., 2002. Retail bank interest rate pass-through: New evidence at the Euro area level. 
ECB working paper no. 136. 
Diebold, F.X.,Chen, C, 1996. Testing structural stability with endogenous breakpoint – A size 
comparison of analytic and bootstrap procedures. Journal of Econometrics 70, 221--241. 
Diez-Guardia, N., 2000. ECRI Research Report No.1: Consumer credit in the EU. European Credit 
Research Institute, Brussels. 
Economic and Financial Committee, 2002. Report by the Economic and Financial Committee  
(ETC) on EU financial integration.. European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, Economic Papers No. 171. 
Enders, W.,Granger, C.W.J., 1998. Unit root tests and asymmetric adjustment with an example 
using the term structure of interest rates. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 16, 
304--311. 
Enders, W., Siklos, P.I., 2000. Cointegration and threshold adjustment. Working paper. 
Engle, R.F., Granger, C.W.J., 1987. Cointegration and error correction: Representation, 
estimation, and testing. Econometrica 55, 251--276. 
European Central Bank, 1999a. Possible Effects of EMU on the EU banking system in the 
medium and long term. February.  
European Central Bank, 1999b. Banking in the euro area: Structural features and trends. ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, April, pp. 41--53.  
European Central Bank, 1999c. The effects of technology on the EU banking systems. July. 
European Central Bank, 2000a. The euro area one year after the introduction of the euro: Key 
characteristics and changes in the financial structure. ECB Monthly Bulletin, January, pp. 
35--49. 
 45
European Central Bank, 2000b. EMU and banking supervision. ECB Monthly Bulletin, April, 
pp.  49--64. 
Gregory, A.W., Nason, J.M.,Watt, D.G., 1996. Testing for structural breaks in co-integrated 
relationships. Journal of Econometrics 71, 321--341.  
Hansen, B.E., 1992. Tests for parameter instability in regressions with I(1) processes. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistic 10, 321--335. 
Kleimeier, S., 2001. Banking in western Europe, in: M. Warner (Ed.), International Encyclopedia 
of Business and Management, 2nd edition, Thomson Learning, London, pp. 421--429. 
Kleimeier, S., Sander, H., 2000. Regionalisation versus globalisation in European financial 
market integration: Evidence from cointegration analysis. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 24, 1005--1043. 
Kleimeier, S., Sander, H., 2001, ECRI Research Report No. 2: Consumer Credit in the Eurozone: 
Evidence on the Emergence of a Single Eurozone Retail Banking Market., European 
Credit Research Institute, Brussels. 
Marois, B., 1997. French banks and European strategy. European Management Journal 15, 183--
189. 
Mojon, B., 2000. Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary policy. ECB 
working paper, No. 40, November. 
OECD, 2000. OECD Economic Outlook No. 68, p. 206. 
Padoa-Schioppa, T., 2000. Is a euroland banking system already emerging?, Lecture at the 
Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières, Vienna 29 April, European 
Central Bank (www.ecb.int/key/00/sp000429.htm). 
 
 
 46
Quandt, R., 1960. Tests of the hypothesis that a linear regression system obeys two separate 
regimes. Journal of the American Statistical Association 55, 324--330. 
Sander, H., Kleimeier, S., 2002. Asymmetric adjustment of commercial bank interest rates in the 
Euro area: An empirical investigation into interest rate pass-through. Kredit und Kapital 
35, 161-192. 
Tong, H., 1983. Threshold models in non-linear time series: Lecture Notes in Statistics 21, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin. 
Tourani Rad, A., van Beek, L., 1999. Market valuation of European bank mergers. European 
Management Journal 17, 532--540. 
Zimmerman, G.C., 1995. Implementing the single banking market in Europe. Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 3, 35--51.  
 
  Table 1: Value of M&As in the financial sector between 1985 and 1997 
 
acquirer 
 commercial bank securities firm insurance company 
target value % of total value % of total value % of total 
Panel A: Domestic M&As 
      
commercial bank 89.0 36.0 23.0 9.3 11.0 4.4 
securities firm 9.0 3.6 19.0 7.7 6.0 2.4 
insurance company 20.0 8.1 24.0 9.7 46.0 18.6 
Panel B: Intra-European M&As       
commercial bank 15.0 17.9 4.3 5.1 11.2 13.4 
securities firm 8.7 10.4 5.8 6.9 0.3 0.4 
insurance company 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3 37.0 44.2 
Panel C: Europe-Non-Europe M&As       
commercial bank 14.5 14.5 15.6 15.6 1.0 1.0 
securities firm 4.3 4.3 15.9 15.9 3.1 3.1 
insurance company 0.3 0.3 12.9 12.9 32.7 32.7 
Source: Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999). Values are given in billion of US dollar. For each panel, the 
per cent figures sum to 100. 
 
Table 2: Structural Breaks in the Cointegration Relationship 
Mortgage Lending Rates Consumer Lending Rates Corporate Lending Rates Country 
Rolling 
Chow F-test 
Break point 
(mm/yy) 
Rolling 
Chow F-test 
Break point 
(mm/yy) 
Rolling 
Chow F-test 
Break point 
(mm/yy) 
Panel A: Nominal Lending Rates 
Austria 27.76 01/98 34.91 02/98 24.96 11/96 
Belgium 112.74 05/99 121.05 12/95 54.52 06/97 
Denmark   43.87 03/98 89.54 04/98 
Finland 45.31 09/97 19.37 05/00   
France 14.29 (06/99) 55.81 06/98 23.60 03.97 
Germany 62.56 06/99 38.75 08/00 253.28 03/00 
Greece 118.96 11/00 168.55 02/01 340.32 03/00 
Ireland 62.55 01/98   98.56 09/98 
Italy 153.35 05/98   367.97 11/98 
Netherlands 48.97 07/99   122.89 11/98 
Portugal 63.81 01/97 733.21 04/98 375.26 05/99 
Spain 82.20 03/97 623.64 01/00 57.68 02/97 
Sweden 32.86 06/99 25.58 09/96 62.76 05/99 
United Kingdom 48.28 11/00 124.75 12/98   
Panel B: Real Lending Rates 
Austria 44.24 07/99 25.77 12/96 39.52 11/99 
Belgium 50.67 07/97 145.02 12/95 51.65 06/97 
Denmark   13.65 (06/00) 28.40 06/00 
Finland 81.35 02/96 32.47 07/96   
France 11.16 - 22.90 06/01 34.45 11/98 
Germany 17.39 01/00 14.94 (11/99) 23.53 12/97 
Greece 15.78 (09/00) 93.72 06/00 120.96 09/00 
Ireland 31.50 12/98   98.56 09/98 
Italy 106.67 03/98   144.83 02/98 
Netherlands 90.74 12/00   77.13 12/00 
Portugal 48.58 11/97 114.51 03/98 50.19 05/98 
Spain 30.72 12/00 46.60 11.97 17.34 03/96 
Sweden 32.11 03/98 25.60 02/97 27.94 03/98 
United Kingdom 28.13 09/99 33.75 12/98   
Note: Parentheses indicate that a breakpoint is only marginally significant. 
 
 
Table 3: Cointegration of Lending Rates 
Mortgage Lending Rates Consumer Lending Rates Corporate Lending Rates 
nom real nom real nom real 
coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT 
Country Period  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Austria full no -0.113 yes -0.237 no -1.778 yes -0.197 no 0.017 yes -0.201 
   (-3.950)  (-3.154)  (-3.842)  (-2.501)  (0.241)  (-2.497) 
 pre-EMU no -0.091 yes -0.375 no -0.141 yes -0.292 no -0.133 yes -0.422 
   (-1.701)  (-2.776)  (-1.591)  (-2.369)  (-1.709)  (-3.264) 
 EMU no -0.417 yes -0.385 no 0.057 yes -0.428 no 0.159 yes -0.245 
   (-8.797)  (-2.932)  -0.496  (-3.362)  (1.096)  (-1.944) 
 postbreak   yes -0.600       yes -0.543 
     (-3.000)        (-2.150) 
Belgium full no -0.143 yes -0.152 no -0.177 no -0.119 no -0.140 no -0.136 
   (-4.141)  (-2.547)  (-3.094)  (-2.144)  (-3.578)  (-2.415) 
 pre-EMU no -0.178 no -0.111 no -0.224 no -0.085 yes -0.168 no -0.085 
   (-2.748)  (-1.573)  (-2.537)  (-1.075)  (-3.381)  (-1.419) 
 EMU no -0.093 yes -0.268 no -0.084 yes -0.205 no 0.167 yes -0.626 
   (-1.065)  (-2.099)  (-1.059)  (-1.495)  (1.839)  (-3.892) 
 postbreak yes -0.437           
   (-3.684)           
Denmark full     no -0.214 no -0.109 no -0.135 no -0.128 
       (-3.565)  (-1.817)  (-2.360)  (-2.290) 
 pre-EMU     no -0.067 no -0.05 no -0.047 no -0.065 
       (-0.897)  (-0.642)  (-0.457)  (-0.788) 
 EMU     yes -0.119 no -0.177 yes -0.786 no -0.069 
       (-0.838)  (-1.935)  (-4.526)  (-0.827) 
 postbreak       yes -0.488   yes -0.914 
         (-2.111)    (-5.194) 
Finland full no -0.081 no 0.067 yes -0.132 yes -0.129     
   (-2.754)  (-1.525)  (-1.913)  (-1.798)     
 pre-EMU no -0.052 no -0.027 yes -0.312 yes -0.531     
   (-1.553)  (-0.488)  (-2.587)  (-2.647)     
 EMU no -0.222 no -0.262 no 0.146 no -0.145     
   (-2.365)  (-2.378)  (1.822)  (-1.372)     
 postbreak     no 0.227       
       (2.168)       
France full yes -0.368 yes -0.206 yes -0.198 yes -0.175 yes -0.117 yes -0.164 
   (-5.713)  (-2.723)  (-4.087)  (-1.862)  (-1.924)  (-2.623) 
 pre-EMU yes -0.296 yes -0.227 yes -0.32 yes -0.306 yes -0.212 yes -0.186 
   (-3.182)  (-2.349)  (-3.816)  (-2.377)  (-0.268)  (-1.991) 
 EMU yes -0.405 yes -0.363 yes -0.196 yes -0.114 yes -0.172 yes -0.402 
   (-4.223)  (-3.085)  (-1.994)  (-0.954)  (-1.041)  (-2.298) 
 postbreak yes -0.561     yes -0.554     
   (-4.074)      (-1.604)     
 
Table 3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates 
Mortgage Lending Rates Consumer Lending Rates Corporate Lending Rates 
nom real nom real nom real 
coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT 
Country Period  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Germany full no -0.136 no -0.107 no -0.009 no -0.182 no -0.032 yes -0.241 
   (-3.044)  (-1.904)  (-2.089)  (-2.778)  (-1.637)  (-3.277) 
 pre-EMU yes -0.197 no -0.127 yes -0.068 no -0.107 no -0.147 no -0.19 
   (-2.909)  (-1.801)  (-0.877)  (-1.239)  (-2.166)  (-2.131) 
 EMU no 0.056 no -0.073 no -0.057 no -0.161 no -0.042 yes -0.334 
   (0.740)  (-0.766)  (-1.230)  (-1.360)  (-0.776)  (-2.663) 
 postbreak no -0.058 no -0.147 yes -0.411 yes -0.352 no -0.378   
   (-0.648)  (-1.087)  (-4.322)  (-2.233)  (-4.553)   
Greece EMU no 0.017 yes -0.13 no -0.079 no -0.068 no -0.062 no -0.005 
   (0.874)  (-1.415)  (-2.383)  (-2.082)  (-2.493)  (-0.191) 
 postbreak yes -0.088 yes -0.4 yes -0.256 yes -0.271 no -0.055 yes -0.274 
   (-0.637)  (-2.439)  (-1.806)  (-4.504)  (-2.201)  (-2.507) 
Ireland full no -0.067 no -0.115     no -0.077 no -0.123 
   (-2.405)  (-2.509)      (-2.152)  (-2.461) 
 pre-EMU no -0.132 yes -0.182     no -0.128 no -0.199 
   (-2.069)  (-2.070)      (-1.622)  (-2.317) 
 EMU no -0.150 no -0.084     yes -0.712 yes -0.165 
   (-2.258)  (-1.445)      (-4.220)  (-2.242) 
Italy full no -0.108 no -0.048     no -0.021 no -0.04 
   (-5.732)  (-1.743)      (-2.718)  (-1.744) 
 pre-EMU no -0.054 no 0.014     no -0.016 no 0.018 
   (-0.964)  -0.37      (-0.628)  -0.536 
 EMU no -0.263 yes -0.274     yes -0.321 yes -0.29 
   (-3.832)  (-2.483)      (-4.367)  (-2.821) 
Netherlands full no -0.175 no -0.075     no -0.059 no -0.053 
   (-4.229)  (-1.829)      (-2.359)  (-1.143) 
 pre-EMU yes -0.198 yes -0.216     no -0.070 yes -0.181 
   (-2.759)  (-1.392)      (-1.959)  (-1.696) 
 EMU no -0.036 no -0.061     yes -0.265 no -0.024 
   (-0.352)  (-1.187)      (-1.484)  (-0.427) 
 postbreak no -0.266 yes -0.586       yes -0.445 
   (-1.945)  (-3.685)        (-3.275) 
Portugal full no -0.071 yes -0.052 yes -0.384 no -0.134 yes -0.138 yes -0.043 
   (-2.838)  (-1.087)  (-4.792)  (-2.434)  (-3.739)  (-0.885) 
 pre-EMU no -0.074 no -0.063 yes -0.309 no -0.08 yes -0.717 yes -0.178 
   (-2.272)  (-0.991)  (-2.948)  (-1.072)  (-5.032)  (-1.893) 
 EMU no -0.273 yes -0.033 yes -0.767 yes -0.443 yes -0.434 no -0.066 
   (-4.391)  (-0.398)  (-4.992)  (-2.781)  (-3.530)  (-0.872) 
 postbreak         yes -0.660   
           (-3.443)   
 
Table 3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates 
Mortgage Lending Rates Consumer Lending Rates Corporate Lending Rates 
nom real nom real nom real 
coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT coint? βECT 
Country Period  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat)  (t-stat) 
Spain full no -0.035 no -0.12 yes -0.285 yes -0.111 no -0.058 yes -0.229 
   (-1.940)  (-2.545)  (-4.226)  (-2.096)  (-0.920)  (-3.269) 
 pre-EMU no -0.065 no -0.141 no -0.338 no -0.173 no -0.201 yes -0.241 
   (-2.439)  (-1.967)  (-5.702)  (-2.462)  (-2.317)  (-3.064) 
 EMU no -0.21 yes -0.296 yes -0.517 yes -0.434 yes -0.531 yes -0.393 
   (-5.106)  (-3.016)  (-3.226)  (-3.817)  (-2.559)  (-2.753) 
 postbreak   yes -0.321 yes -0.803       
     (-1.488)  (-4.528)       
Sweden full no -0.162 no -0.073 no -0.086 no -0.153 no -0.046 no -0.059 
   (-2.297)  (-1.558)  (-2.119)  (-2.728)  (-1.981)  (-1.200) 
 pre-EMU yes -0.322 no -0.078 no -0.152 no -0.2 no -0.131 no -0.098 
   (-1.961)  (-1.340)  (-2.310)  (-2.157)  (-3.138)  (-1.416) 
 EMU no -0.313 yes 0.045 yes -0.267 no 0.06 yes -0.185 no 0.314 
   (-2.632)  (0.299)  (-2.740)  -0.622  (-1.257)  (2.439) 
 postbreak yes -0.228       yes -0.162   
   (-1.701)        (-1.003)   
UK full no -0.074 no -0.082 no -0.143 yes -0.241     
   (-1.925)  (-1.585)  (-3.468)  (-3.404)     
 pre-EMU no -0.21 no -0.159 yes -0.203 yes -0.396     
   (-2.871)  (-1.835)  (-2.387)  (-3.611)     
 EMU no -0.048 no -0.106 yes -0.356 yes -0.465     
   (-0.600)  (-1.557)  (-3.086)  (-3.423)     
 postbreak yes -0.490 yes -0.091         
      (-3.284)   (-0.671)                 
Note:  Cointegration is considered to exist if at least 2 test statistics of Table A3 are significant at the 10% level or if at least 1 test statistic is significant at 5% level 
or higher.
Table 4: Pass-Through Model Selection 
AIC values at optimal lag length cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration 
asymmetry tests 
country period TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* 
coint. test: 
H0: Σi ρi=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ2 
cointe-
gration? DW DF       ADF  
cointe- 
gration? 
selected 
pass- 
through 
model 
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates 
Austria full -18.712 -19.210 -20.205 -15.426 -19.260 4.262 3.431 3.682 4.055 no 0.023 -2.260  no STD 
Austria pre-EMU 18.091 14.324 11.666 19.284 15.406 4.183 9.324 3.000 4.966 no 0.195 -1.276  no STD 
Austria EMU -41.364 -42.298 -41.449 -42.161 -43.745 3.144 1.545   no 0.471 -2.573  yes SYM 
Belgium full 92.202 90.875 82.901 90.789 85.735 5.492 11.358 0.008 11.380 no 0.143 -2.018  no STD 
Belgium pre-EMU 38.830 36.056 33.647 38.097 32.660 3.429 5.579   no 0.156 -1.074  no STD 
Belgium EMU -6.780 -8.664 -10.337 -8.065 -9.311 4.686 4.645 0.522 5.344 no 0.219 -1.982 -2.736 no STD 
Finland full 28.723 26.298 26.116 28.415 22.683 3.403 5.813   no 0.044 -0.895  no STD 
Finland pre-EMU -15.419 -15.880 -35.379 -14.563 -18.739 9.707 26.536 2.588 26.420 yes 0.098 -0.196  no BTAR* 
Finland EMU -23.571 -26.107 -24.719 -21.695 -24.720 5.915 4.013   no 0.598 -2.691  yes SYM 
France full 67.725 66.596 62.406 67.622 48.170 10.792 20.781   yes, asym 0.037 -0.607 -0.965 no MTAR* 
France pre-EMU 15.998 15.389 14.995 16.838 4.885 6.184 12.064   yes, asym 0.073 -0.254 -0.765 no MTAR* 
France EMU -24.463 -26.761 -26.292 -25.912 -26.939 10.090 2.365   yes, asym 1.136 -3.866 -4.432 yes MTAR* 
Germany full 31.653 31.142 30.166 32.298 26.782 5.196 5.376   no 0.067 -2.271 -2.172 no STD 
Germany pre-EMU 4.736 3.519 3.372 5.604 -4.700 5.693 10.859   no 0.107 -0.335  no STD 
Germany EMU -14.335 -17.113 -17.086 -14.551 -17.561 5.168 3.331   no 0.134 -1.661 -2.565 no STD 
Greece EMU 67.819 66.050 66.419 67.555 66.716 1.697 1.894   no 0.207 -1.498  no STD 
Ireland full 126.441 124.099 124.119 125.856 124.344 4.348 2.285   no 0.215 -2.162  no STD 
Ireland pre-EMU 4.796 0.401 -7.876 5.574 -4.633 8.474 13.848 0.057 9.667 yes, asym 0.321 -2.293  no BTAR* 
Ireland EMU 25.097 24.007 25.222 20.236 20.236 5.299 5.915   no 0.209 -1.790 -2.197 no STD 
Italy full 151.658 150.551 149.721 151.593 149.349 2.581 2.166   no 0.230 -3.010  no STD 
Italy pre-EMU 60.029 55.139 52.176 59.219 58.592 3.628 6.553 0.799 8.862 no 0.324 -2.706  no STD 
Italy EMU 0.142 -1.241 -3.613 0.302 -3.439 3.957 4.649 0.134 5.716 no 0.411 -2.346  yes SYM 
Netherlands full 51.182 50.242 51.009 50.374 47.957 4.585 3.398   no 0.075 -2.825 -2.368 no STD 
Netherlands pre-EMU 31.289 30.688 30.772 29.516 24.529 3.716 5.580   no 0.196 -1.519  no STD 
Netherlands EMU -12.316 -13.140 -19.967 -12.641 -16.279 5.055 10.102 0.281 9.767 no 0.179 -1.271 -2.019 no STD 
Portugal full 127.514 126.374 126.521 125.083 122.139 4.809 5.162   no 0.153 -2.135 -2.171 no STD 
Portugal pre-EMU 29.632 27.846 27.266 29.520 24.414 5.031 4.743   no 0.166 -1.866 -2.042 no STD 
Portugal EMU -0.674 -0.916 0.225 -0.542 -2.885 4.973 2.639   no 0.490 -2.852  yes SYM 
Spain full 107.891 106.126 105.209 107.788 102.890 7.853 4.931   yes, asym 0.487 -3.931  yes MTAR* 
Spain pre-EMU 45.312 43.086 40.946 45.256 43.206 5.152 5.458 0.574 6.158 no 0.785 -3.209  yes SYM 
Spain EMU -22.087 -22.242 -25.697 -22.905 -23.730 4.563 5.009 0.040 5.160 no 0.592 -2.701 -3.541 yes SYM 
Sweden full 79.638 76.305 72.303 79.886 77.787 5.421 8.952 0.558 9.110 yes, asym 0.157 -1.877 -2.404 no BTAR* 
Sweden pre-EMU 29.257 26.531 23.244 29.047 26.067 3.520 7.399 0.401 7.404 no 0.148 -1.421 -1.610 no STD 
Sweden EMU -1.257 -3.321 -2.033 1.186 -0.542 6.709 4.285   no 0.188 -1.855 -2.578 no STD 
 Table 4 continued: Pass-Through Model Selection 
AIC values at optimal lag length cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration 
asymmetry tests 
country period TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* 
coint. test: 
H0: Σi ρi=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ2 
cointe-
gration? DW DF      ADF 
cointe- 
gration? 
selected 
pass- 
through 
model 
UK full 141.913 135.889 129.941 141.772 131.902 6.410 6.660 1.157 12.758 yes,asym 0.136 -3.138 -2.124 no BTAR* 
UK pre-EMU 45.663 44.675 44.875 45.904 43.850 3.731 6.989   no 0.251 -0.553 -0.553 no STD 
UK EMU 23.008 17.566 18.252 21.929 19.927 4.996 5.618   no 0.328 -2.148 -2.328 no STD 
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates 
Austria full 18.355 17.562 15.181 23.000 19.828 5.908 5.705 5.458 4.758 no 0.022 -2.501  no STD 
Austria pre-EMU 41.087 39.837 39.437 41.817 38.164 1.995 3.637   no 0.253 -1.435 -1.015 no STD 
Austria EMU -47.224 -47.909 -46.467 -45.636 -47.292 6.808 1.012   yes, sym. 0.623 -3.550 -3.241 yes SYM 
Belgium full 181.190 180.592 180.262 177.819 148.008 28.493 43.942   yes, asym 0.098 -2.533  no MTAR* 
Belgium pre-EMU 89.256 87.285 86.167 89.959 82.737 3.931 6.999   no 0.248 -1.629  no STD 
Belgium EMU 1.030 -0.588 -3.609 0.059 -3.147 4.051 6.681 0.049 6.675 no 0.322 -2.197  no STD 
Denmark full 77.845 77.641 71.542 78.164 76.877 4.417 0.686 5.326 9.038 no 0.214 -2.184 -1.955 no STD 
Denmark pre-EMU 0.520 -1.276 -4.726 0.597 -0.550 3.185 6.833 0.201 6.912 no 0.379 -1.918  no STD 
Denmark EMU 12.653 11.270 10.230 10.082 7.516 8.609 5.330   yes, asym 0.933 -3.375 -3.327 yes MTAR* 
Finland full 129.889 128.861 128.399 127.865 119.506 6.033 11.433   yes, asym 0.192 -2.075 -0.741 no MTAR* 
Finland pre-EMU 59.790 54.981 55.216 58.911 49.056 6.008 12.008   yes, asym 0.617 -2.438 -0.659 yes MTAR* 
Finland EMU -11.992 -13.650 -11.693 -12.367 -19.790 8.817 8.729   yes, asym 0.691 -2.932  yes MTAR* 
France full 95.562 93.824 94.703 93.159 77.991 9.990 18.785   yes, asym 0.040 -0.692 -0.974 no MTAR* 
France pre-EMU 40.386 39.082 38.453 42.472 31.068 5.775 11.461   no 0.110 -0.522  no STD 
France EMU -40.027 -40.775 -40.317 -41.478 -42.064 4.734 3.108   no 0.588 -2.432  yes SYM 
Germany full -62.051 -62.442 -65.429 -56.973 -61.289 6.727 6.122 5.683 4.815 yes, asym 0.012 -3.398 -2.597 yes BTAR* 
Germany pre-EMU 6.206 3.030 1.929 3.259 1.225 2.737 4.935   no 0.095 -0.736  no STD 
Germany EMU -83.435 -85.331 -93.187 -83.207 -83.471 4.365 6.415 0.643 10.550 no 0.072 -0.196 -1.449 no STD 
Greece EMU 143.923 142.346 136.516 144.682 143.855 4.191 8.633 1.748 7.020 no 0.151 -1.088  no STD 
Portugal full 314.500 311.923 314.725 314.472 311.146 4.886 3.235   no 0.671 -4.119 -4.119 yes SYM 
Portugal pre-EMU 139.137 137.954 136.794 139.043 138.572 3.047 3.697 0.001 3.774 no 0.966 -3.933  yes SYM 
Portugal EMU 93.467 92.779 89.893 92.907 91.914 2.615 4.488 0.137 4.829 no 1.187 -4.017 -2.229 yes SYM 
Spain full 176.654 174.535 169.552 177.281 174.567 5.017 8.797 0.857 8.754 no 0.473 -3.342  yes SYM 
Spain pre-EMU 53.491 50.555 47.809 53.359 49.841 3.462 4.158 0.701 6.717 no 0.583 -2.722  yes SYM 
Spain EMU 37.273 32.493 28.699 36.340 29.755 9.674 10.288 1.985 10.194 yes, asym 1.211 -4.447 -4.306 yes BTAR* 
Sweden full 28.713 26.861 21.840 29.446 26.492 3.110 6.629 1.326 9.075 no 0.236 -1.750 -1.669 no STD 
Sweden pre-EMU -3.373 -4.422 -5.973 -5.217 -5.445 1.352 3.840 0.174 3.992 no 0.735 -2.821 -2.438 yes SYM 
Sweden EMU -44.830 -46.750 -47.121 -45.355 -47.110 2.496 3.677 0.007 3.668 no 0.604 -2.266 -2.331 yes SYM 
UK full 263.209 262.471 252.506 262.793 252.449 7.298 10.789   yes, asym 0.221 -2.640 -2.087 no MTAR* 
UK pre-EMU 64.861 64.549 62.909 64.998 59.107 4.949 5.575   no 0.135 -0.960  no STD 
UK EMU 36.254 28.249 33.296 36.184 26.370 7.403 9.472   yes, asym 0.700 -3.333  yes MTAR* 
 
Table 4 continued: Pass-Through Model Selection 
AIC values at optimal lag length cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration 
asymmetry tests 
country period TAR0 TAR* BTAR MTAR0 MTAR* 
coint. test: 
H0: Σi ρi=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ2 
cointe-
gration? DW DF      ADF 
cointe- 
gration? 
selected 
pass- 
through 
model 
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates 
Austria full -43.629 -43.815 -43.668 -38.839 -40.806 5.381 7.297   no 0.016 -2.109 -1.811 no STD 
Austria pre-EMU 16.502 11.820 9.505 17.367 12.852 4.173 10.043 3.628 4.225 no 0.156 -1.017  no STD 
Austria EMU -55.898 -56.726 -60.344 -57.053 -57.116 5.327 6.911 0.198 6.284 no 0.451 -2.832  yes SYM 
Belgium full 10.386 9.210 8.752 8.745 4.573 9.281 6.161   yes, asym 0.688 -4.368  yes MTAR* 
Belgium pre-EMU -31.691 -33.068 -33.352 -35.647 -36.521 4.024 5.435   no 1.255 -4.621  yes SYM 
Belgium EMU -14.187 -16.008 -16.872 -13.939 -20.421 6.881 6.941   yes, asym 0.486 -2.495  yes MTAR* 
Denmark full 75.773 71.279 61.092 74.096 70.924 8.158 9.208 3.455 16.700 yes, asym 0.190 -2.227 -2.382 no MTAR* 
Denmark pre-EMU 27.854 26.667 23.532 25.305 22.525 4.027 5.627   no 0.197 -1.378  no STD 
Denmark EMU 10.677 3.047 0.780 11.818 9.250 4.714 3.865 3.558 14.109 no 0.458 -1.825 -2.017 yes SYM 
France full 109.413 106.616 103.113 109.322 99.124 6.189 10.159   yes, asym 0.062 -1.006 -1.564 no MTAR* 
France pre-EMU 29.103 26.211 28.152 29.561 22.722 4.215 6.538   no 0.070 -0.434 -1.330 no STD 
France EMU 9.182 7.837 7.814 9.209 6.966 7.758 2.119   yes, asym 1.058 -3.660 -3.896 yes MTAR* 
Germany full -3.503 -7.066 -5.090 -4.249 -6.387 2.954 4.580   no 0.189 -1.420  no STD 
Germany pre-EMU -41.853 -42.221 -43.540 -40.799 -45.274 2.868 4.404   no 0.308 -2.004  no STD 
Germany EMU -25.039 -27.459 -30.691 -22.690 -23.851 3.520 5.531 2.496 9.168 no 0.144 -0.709  no STD 
Greece EMU 127.066 126.389 116.923 128.460 127.107 4.979 11.615 1.938 10.853 no 0.166 -1.067  no STD 
Ireland full 50.256 46.498 40.883 50.066 45.023 6.163 7.946 1.289 11.089 no 0.389 -2.981 -2.024 yes SYM 
Ireland pre-EMU 10.077 9.489 1.463 10.273 7.986 6.635 10.080 0.003 9.401 no 0.649 -2.903 -1.949 yes SYM 
Ireland EMU -13.299 -17.056 -18.059 -12.070 -14.573 4.054 6.624 1.276 6.810 no 0.358 -1.892  no STD 
Italy full 98.323 97.699 87.826 94.209 91.515 5.107 12.339 0.001 12.353 no 0.176 -2.770  no STD 
Italy pre-EMU 25.615 21.013 21.372 22.912 19.594 4.654 7.192   no 0.282 -2.814  no STD 
Italy EMU -31.809 -33.647 -37.445 -30.788 -36.023 5.623 8.890 0.840 5.771 no 0.202 -2.584  no STD 
Netherlands full 88.105 87.430 87.422 88.399 85.417 4.663 2.893   no 0.821 -4.339  yes SYM 
Netherlands pre-EMU -1.091 -3.667 -4.690 0.071 -1.603 2.262 4.233 1.698 5.967 no 0.862 -2.657 -0.716 yes SYM 
Netherlands EMU 25.902 24.803 24.342 25.282 24.536 3.596 3.442 0.158 3.440 no 0.807 -2.626  yes SYM 
Portugal full 196.386 192.398 191.121 196.795 190.441 5.042 6.744   no 0.377 -2.928 -2.387 no STD 
Portugal pre-EMU 73.258 69.654 65.301 73.607 73.152 8.890 9.303 0.861 9.327 yes, asym 1.556 -5.232 -5.331 yes BTAR* 
Portugal EMU 13.385 12.177 11.384 14.338 9.858 8.404 4.707   yes, asym 0.616 -3.395  yes MTAR* 
 
 
Table 4 continued: Pass-Through Model Selection 
AIC values at optimal lag length cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration 
asymmetry tests 
country period TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* 
coint. test: 
H0: Σi ρi=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ2 
cointe-
gration? DW DF ADF 
cointe- 
gration? 
selected 
pass- 
through 
model 
Spain full 116.671 114.864 116.380 116.906 116.403 4.047 2.994   no 0.965 -5.371 -3.348 yes SYM 
Spain pre-EMU 33.687 31.000 30.419 34.317 29.487 2.444 4.424   no 0.800 -2.799  yes SYM 
Spain EMU 12.731 12.443 10.750 12.718 11.268 5.104 3.307 0.075 3.426 no 1.499 -4.771  yes SYM 
Sweden full 57.601 52.644 54.189 57.477 52.872 3.219 4.716   no 0.332 -2.644 -2.313 no STD 
Sweden pre-EMU 14.202 8.051 7.167 10.970 9.506 4.165 3.447 0.703 8.686 no 0.551 -2.914 -2.451 yes SYM 
Sweden EMU -42.618 -42.944 -43.385 -41.800 -43.486 6.207 2.180   yes, asym 0.870 -3.233  yes MTAR* 
Note: For the critical values of the Engle-Granger cointegration tests see notes to table 4. The critical values for the cointegration and asymmetry tests of the best TAR model are listed in Enders and Siklos (2000). The critical values 
vary depending on the type of TAR model, the sample size, and the lag length of the model. As approximate benchmarks, one can consider test statistics of 6.0 or higher for the cointegration test and test statistics of -2.5 and lower for 
the asymmetry tests to allow the rejection of the null hypothesis. – The minimum AIC value of the optimal TAR model is represented in bold. Engle-Granger cointegration is considered to exist if either 2 test statistics are significant at 
10% level or 1 test statistic is significant at the 5% level or higher. 
 
   Table 5: Extended Pass-Through of Money Market Rate Innovations onto Lending Rates in Europe 
Error Correction 
Speed of Adjustment 
Lags Country Period Model Impact 
Multiplier 
β2 
Long-run 
Multiplier 
θ βECT,1 βECT,2 βECT, 3 
Optimal  
Threshold 
a0* k* n* 
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates 
Austria full 
 
STD 0.136 
(2.597) 
0.653     4 1 
 pre 
 
STD 0.064 
(0.752) 
0.563     4 1 
 EMU SYM 0.158 
(3.256) 
0.590 -0.423 
(-5.550) 
   3 0 
Belgium full 
 
STD 0.282 
(3.053) 
0.641     2 1 
 pre 
 
STD 0.240 
(1.721) 
0.712     2 1 
 EMU STD 0.356 
(2.919) 
0.413     0 1 
Finland full 
 
STD 0.374 
(5.826) 
0.749     1 1 
 pre BTAR* 0.304 
(3.510) 
1.032 -0.082 
(-0.960) 
-10.617 
(-0.858) 
0.057 
(0.908) 
0.009 1 1 
 EMU SYM 0.475 
(4.607) 
0.832 -0.216 
(-1.869) 
   1 1 
France full MTAR* 0.134 
(2.221) 
0.611 0.003 
(0.041) 
-0.028 
(-1.741) 
 0.275 3 0 
 pre MTAR* -0.080 
(-1.044) 
0.545 0.104 
(0.748) 
-0.024 
(-0.954) 
 0.246 4 0 
 EMU MTAR* 0.391 
(4.039) 
0.515 -0.530 
(-1.963) 
-0.812 
(-4.171) 
 0.053 3 0 
Germany full STD 0.483 
(4.348) 
0.185     4 2 
 pre 
 
STD 0.325 
(1.824) 
0.405     0 2 
 EMU 
 
STD 0.584 
(4.229) 
0.145     4 2 
Greece EMU STD -0.001 
(-0.044) 
-0.001     0 4 
Ireland full STD 0.239 
(3.549) 
0.589     1 1 
 pre BTAR* 0.205 
(3.809) 
0.492 -0.081 
(-0.781) 
-0.228 
(-1.797) 
-0.251 
(-1.555) 
0.359 3 1 
 EMU 
 
STD 0.235 
(1.120) 
0.870     1 1 
Italy full 
 
STD 0.286 
(2.695) 
0.694     2 3 
 pre STD 0.257 
(1.632) 
0.783     2 3 
 EMU SYM 0.179 
(1.258) 
0.552 -0.596 
(-4.037) 
   1 2 
Netherlands full 
 
STD 0.142 
(1.767) 
0.459     1 1 
 pre 
 
STD 0.071 
(0.577) 
0.092     0 1 
 EMU 
 
STD 0.152 
(1.431) 
0.315     0 1 
Portugal full 
 
STD 0.212 
(2.764) 
0.926     2 4 
 pre 
 
STD 0.174 
(1.500) 
0.468     0 4 
 EMU SYM 0.017 
(0.190) 
0.813 -0.180 
(-2.339) 
   1 1 
 
 
  Table 5 continued: Extented Pass-Through of Money Market Rate Innovations onto Lending Rates in Europe 
Error Correction 
Speed of Adjustment 
Lags Country Period Model Impact 
Multiplier 
β2 
Long-run 
Multiplier 
θ βECT,1 βECT,2 βECT, 3 
Optimal  
Threshold 
a0* k* n* 
Spain full MTAR* 0.180 
(4.688) 
1.077 -0.043 
(-1.316) 
0.017 
(0.159) 
 -0.323 1 2 
 pre SYM 0.144 
(2.901) 
1.139 -0.047 
(-0.879) 
   1 2 
 EMU SYM 0.106 
(2.352) 
0.742 -0.345 
(-6.768) 
   1 0 
Sweden full BTAR* 0.074 
(0.376) 
0.711 -0.187 
(-1.760) 
-1.286 
(-0.472) 
0.026 
(0.222) 
0.089 3 0 
 pre STD 0.048 
(0.176) 
0.046     0 3 
 EMU STD -0.024 
(-0.075) 
-0.038     0 3 
UK full BTAR* 0.054 
(1.511) 
0.441 -0.090 
(-2.683) 
0.030 
(0.796) 
-0.135 
(-2.538) 
0.863 4 1 
 pre STD 0.037 
(0.526) 
-0.443     4 4 
 EMU STD 0.002 
(0.053) 
0.003     0 1 
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates 
Austria full STD 0.143 
(2.055) 
0.750     3 4 
 pre STD 0.049 
(0.415) 
0.908     3 3 
 EMU SYM 0.219 
(3.872) 
0.589 -0.431 
(-4.432) 
   3 4 
Belgium full MTAR* 0.915 
(3.900) 
1.095 -0.022 
(-0.290) 
-0.170 
(-4.203) 
 0.097 2 3 
 pre STD 0.980 
(2.795) 
1.321     1 1 
 EMU STD 0.488 
(3.013) 
0.369     33 1 
Denmark full STD 0.320 
(3.275) 
0.582     3 2 
 pre STD 0.167 
(1.523) 
0.174     0 3 
 EMU MTAR* 0.047 
(0.392) 
0.574 -0.472 
(-2.760) 
-0.417 
(-1.420) 
 -0.252 3 1 
Finland full MTAR* 0.640 
(3.610) 
1.027 0.381 
(1.413) 
-0.061 
(1.507) 
 0.458 2 1 
 pre MTAR* 0.284 
(0.762) 
1.089 1.349 
(1.852) 
0.039 
(0.358) 
 0.501 2 1 
 EMU MTAR* 0.547 
(4.089) 
0.833 -0.482 
(-2.601) 
0.043 
(0.146) 
 -0.166 1 1 
France full MTAR* -0.063 
(-0.934) 
0.629 0.043 
(0.653) 
-0.035 
(-2.002) 
 0.293 3 4 
 pre STD -0.150 
(-1.582) 
-0.144     0 3 
 EMU SYM 0.033 
(0.483) 
0.285 -0.609 
(-4.257) 
   3 2 
Germany full BTAR* 0.087 
(1.700) 
0.335 -0.038 
(-2.144) 
0.143 
(0.630) 
-0.102 
(-3.247) 
0.153 3 3 
 pre STD 0.140 
(1.376) 
0.412     3 3 
 EMU STD 0.116 
(2.575) 
0.282     2 1 
Greece EMU STD -0.048 
(-0.615) 
-0.084     0 4 
  Table 5 continued: Extented Pass-Through of Money Market Rate Innovations onto Lending Rates in Europe 
Error Correction 
Speed of Adjustment 
Lags Country Period Model Impact 
Multiplier 
β2 
Long-run 
Multiplier 
θ βECT,1 βECT,2 βECT, 3 
Optimal  
Threshold 
a0* k* n* 
Portugal full SYM 0.210 
(0.489) 
1.566 -0.318 
(-3.859) 
   1 0 
 pre SYM 0.251 
(0.303) 
1.692 -0.542 
(-3.845) 
   1 0 
 EMU SYM -0.696 
(-1.583) 
0.477 -0.510 
(-3.297) 
   1 0 
Spain full SYM 0.743 
(5.571) 
1.215 -0.225 
(-3.514) 
   4 0 
 pre SYM 0.705 
(4.731) 
1.246 -0.264 
(-2.766) 
   4 0 
 EMU BTAR* 0.361 
(1.435) 
0.591 -0.613 
(-1.647) 
3.026 
(0.093) 
-1.175 
(-3.704) 
0.007 3 0 
Sweden full STD 0.587 
(4.713) 
0.662     2 4 
 pre SYM 0.819 
(4.182) 
0.862 0.274 
(2.336) 
   4 4 
 EMU SYM 0.064 
(0.410) 
0.292 -0.289 
(-2.391) 
   3 0 
UK full MTAR* 0.098 
(1.258) 
0.969 -0.407 
(-0.388) 
-0.047 
(-1.605) 
 1.823 1 3 
 pre STD 0.210 
(1.804) 
0.630     1 1 
 EMU MTAR* -0.073 
(-1.419) 
-0.041 -0.416 
(-3.014) 
-1.286 
(-3.035) 
 -0.462 1 0 
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates 
Austria full STD 0.251 
(5.449) 
0.691     4 1 
 pre STD 0.129 
(1.978) 
0.513     4 1 
 EMU SYM 0.196 
(3.571) 
0.609 -0.312 
(-3.362) 
   1 4 
Belgium full MTAR* 1.072 
(10.213) 
0.921 -0.325 
(-2.149) 
-0.413 
(-2.852) 
 -0.014 1 2 
 pre SYM 1.009 
(7.066) 
0.934 -0.481 
(-2.449) 
   1 4 
 EMU MTAR* 1.234 
(7.528) 
0.925 -0.934 
(-3.207) 
0.403 
(0.124) 
 -0.238 3 1 
Denmark full MTAR* 0.270 
(3.508) 
0.714 -1.383 
(-2.711) 
-0.144 
(-3.080) 
 0.444 2 3 
 pre STD 0.119 
(0.923) 
0.664     1 3 
 EMU SYM 0.274 
(2.810) 
0.718 -0.312 
(-3.515) 
   3 0 
France full MTAR* 0.451 
(3.895) 
0.885 0.100 
(0.720) 
-0.056 
(-2.309) 
 0.369 4 4 
 pre STD 0.273 
(1.445) 
0.876     4 4 
 EMU MTAR* 0.692 
(4.389) 
0.829 -0.753 
(-4.224) 
0.115 
(0.239) 
 -0.232 3 1 
Germany full STD 0.130 
(2.304) 
0.540     1 3 
 pre STD 0.167 
(1.611) 
0.373     1 1 
 EMU STD 0.104 
(1.903) 
0.558     2 2 
Greece EMU STD -0.049 
(-0.856) 
-0.077     0 1 
   Table 5 continued: Extented Pass-Through of Money Market Rate Innovations onto Lending Rates in Europe 
Error Correction 
Speed of Adjustment 
Lags Country Period Model Impact 
Multiplier 
β2 
Long-run 
Multiplier 
θ βECT,1 βECT,2 βECT, 3 
Optimal  
Threshold 
a0* k* n* 
Ireland full SYM 0.250 
(5.055) 
0.564 -0.104 
(-1.874) 
   3 1 
 pre SYM 0.269 
(4.244) 
0.582 -0.175 
(-1.749) 
   3 1 
 EMU STD 0.192 
(2.067) 
0.624     1 1 
Italy full STD 0.154 
(4.891) 
0.845     3 3 
 pre STD 0.126 
(2.760) 
0.843     3 3 
 EMU STD 0.134 
(2.630) 
0.840     2 4 
Netherlands full SYM 0.435 
(4.637) 
1.075 -0.248 
(-2.974) 
   4 1 
 pre SYM 0.195 
(1.847) 
1.040 -0.212 
(-1.983) 
   3 0 
 EMU SYM 0.406 
(2.304) 
1.028 -0.539 
(-3.370) 
   4 0 
Portugal full STD 0.392 
(2.012) 
0.900     4 2 
 pre BTAR* 0.344 
(0.929) 
1.442 -1.335 
(-4.681) 
136.245 
(1.934) 
-0.084 
(-0.314) 
0.006 2 0 
  TAR* 0.331 
(0.901) 
1.442 -1.351 
(-4.836) 
-0.524 
(-2.525) 
 0.351 2 1 
 EMU MTAR* 0.345 
(1.999) 
0.602 -0.927 
(-3.499) 
-0.495 
(2.861) 
 -0.011 3 0 
Spain full SYM 0.433 
(2.774) 
0.966 -0.021 
(-0.451) 
   3 0 
 pre SYM 0.620 
(5.792) 
1.036 -0.147 
(1.078) 
   1 1 
 EMU SYM 0.641 
(3.422) 
0.887 -1.018 
(-5.398) 
   1 1 
Sweden full STD 0.424 
(2.945) 
0.515     0 3 
 pre SYM 0.661 
(2.930) 
0.889 0.055 
(0.647) 
   3 2 
 EMU MTAR* 0.004 
(0.018) 
0.534 -0.429 
(-1.560) 
-0.439 
(-0.661) 
 -0.101 3 0 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
 
  Table A1: Nominal and Real Cost of Borrowing and Interest Rate Spreads – Descriptive Statistics 
country mortgage lending rates consumer lending rates corporate lending rates 
 full pre-EMU EMU full pre-EMU EMU full pre-EMU EMU 
 mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
Panel A: Nominal cost of borrowing 
Austria 6.22 0.73 6.64 0.65 5.74 0.49 7.71 0.90 8.29 0.79 7.05 0.48 6.62 0.76 7.05 0.69 6.14 0.50 
Belgium 6.08 0.77 6.07 0.85 6.10 0.68 7.71 1.33 8.16 1.65 7.20 0.52 4.63 0.63 4.58 0.51 4.68 0.76 
Denmark       10.16 0.60 10.45 0.45 9.84 0.58 5.99 0.75 6.12 0.73 5.85 0.74 
Finland 5.83 1.07 6.36 1.07 5.23 0.68 7.02 1.13 7.58 1.16 6.40 0.68       
France 7.30 1.14 8.07 1.01 6.43 0.43 9.46 1.23 10.31 1.12 8.51 0.26 5.85 1.40 6.56 1.50 5.05 0.69 
Germany 5.96 0.69 6.17 0.70 5.73 0.60 11.00 0.79 11.47 0.80 10.48 0.28 8.09 0.52 7.95 0.39 8.25 0.61 
Greece 7.22 1.27   7.22 1.27 16.13 3.83   16.13 3.83 16.03 4.85 20.03 1.61 11.54 2.93 
Ireland 6.23 1.14 7.17 0.46 5.17 0.63       9.56 0.75 10.03 0.49 9.04 0.65 
Italy 8.78 3.03 11.09 2.38 6.17 0.50       8.41 2.66 10.48 2.01 6.09 0.53 
Netherlands 6.11 0.63 6.31 0.63 5.88 0.54       3.94 0.78 3.59 0.50 4.33 0.85 
Portugal 7.88 2.75 9.88 2.32 5.63 0.69 12.04 3.10 14.05 3.01 9.77 0.73 8.06 2.95 10.22 2.49 5.63 0.56 
Spain 6.92 2.20 8.27 2.23 5.41 0.61 9.93 2.50 11.54 2.45 8.11 0.55 6.14 2.02 7.35 2.03 4.77 0.74 
Sweden 7.23 1.05 7.73 1.18 6.67 0.45 7.67 1.49 8.62 1.45 6.55 0.18 6.43 1.79 7.43 1.77 5.07 0.26 
UK 7.20 0.97 7.91 0.70 6.41 0.49 17.43 1.79 18.93 1.04 15.74 0.37       
Panel B: Real cost of borrowing 
Austria 4.70 0.67 5.20 0.29 4.13 0.51 6.19 0.85 6.85 0.41 5.45 0.54 5.11 0.71 5.61 0.31 4.53 0.57 
Belgium 4.32 0.82 4.68 0.89 3.91 0.48 5.94 1.53 6.77 1.67 5.02 0.50 2.87 0.68 3.20 0.74 2.50 0.35 
Denmark       8.10 0.86 8.67 0.64 7.49 0.62 3.93 0.88 4.34 0.76 3.50 0.81 
Finland 4.14 1.58 5.25 1.36 2.89 0.52 5.33 1.62 6.47 1.41 4.06 0.53       
France 5.84 1.02 6.63 0.61 4.96 0.52 8.01 1.14 8.88 0.73 7.03 0.59 4.40 1.15 5.13 1.06 3.58 0.52 
Germany 4.51 0.75 4.96 0.51 4.01 0.65 9.55 0.99 10.25 0.63 8.75 0.67 6.64 0.43 6.73 0.38 6.52 0.45 
Greece 4.19 1.98   4.19 1.98 13.10 4.62   13.10 4.62 9.78 4.03 14.03 0.81 8.50 3.71 
Ireland 3.88 2.94 6.30 1.48 1.16 1.35       7.21 2.43 9.15 1.51 5.02 0.99 
Italy 6.03 2.25 7.88 1.40 3.95 0.50       5.67 1.88 7.27 0.96 3.87 0.51 
Netherlands 3.66 1.54 4.61 0.73 2.59 1.51       1.49 1.03 1.89 0.53 1.04 1.26 
Portugal 4.84 2.76 7.94 2.10 2.48 0.77 8.99 3.05 11.11 2.76 6.62 0.70 5.01 2.93 7.28 2.14 2.47 0.86 
Spain 4.05 1.73 5.42 1.16 2.52 0.58 7.06 2.06 8.70 1.37 5.22 0.64 3.27 1.54 4.50 0.96 1.88 0.60 
Sweden 5.93 1.38 6.52 1.48 5.29 0.93 6.34 1.65 7.32 1.51 5.18 0.87 5.00 1.70 5.96 1.56 3.69 0.75 
UK 5.48 0.65 5.67 0.48 5.26 0.76 15.71 1.16 16.69 0.55 14.58 0.39       
  Table A1 continued: Nominal and Real Cost of Borrowing and Interest Rate Spreads – Descriptive Statistics 
country mortgage lending rates consumer lending rates corporate lending rates 
 full pre-EMU EMU full pre-EMU EMU full pre-EMU EMU 
 mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
mean stand. 
dev. 
Panel C: Spreads over Money Market Rate 
Austria 2.59 0.75 3.18 0.42 1.92 0.35 4.08 0.92 4.83 0.53 3.23 0.35 2.99 0.76 3.59 0.47 2.31 0.33 
Belgium 2.36 0.51 2.43 0.58 2.27 0.39 3.99 1.12 4.52 1.26 3.38 0.46 0.90 0.7 0.94 0.13 0.86 0.20 
Denmark       5.95 0.58 6.36 0.32 5.50 0.46 1.78 0.56 2.03 0.56 1.51 0.42 
Finland 1.96 0.61 2.45 0.39 1.41 0.21 3.15 0.66 3.66 0.48 2.57 0.22       
France 3.35 1.01 4.01 0.93 2.61 0.40 5.51 1.09 6.26 0.89 4.68 0.58 1.916 1.02 2.51 1.07 1.23 0.25 
Germany 2.31 0.64 2.67 0.49 1.91 0.55 7.35 0.87 7.96 0.53 6.65 0.63 4.43 0.31 4.44 0.22 4.42 0.39 
Greece 1.54 2.09   1.54 2.09 10.45 2.95   10.45 2.95 5.56 2.19 4.57 1.60 5.85 2.26 
Ireland 1.37 0.56 1.38 0.47 1.35 0.65       4.70 0.60 4.24 0.40 5.22 0.29 
Italy 2.92 0.78 3.43 0.65 2.35 0.44       2.56 0.52 2.82 0.48 2.26 0.41 
Netherlands 2.60 0.70 3.07 0.48 2.06 0.50       0.43 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.51 0.26 
Portugal 2.68 1.02 3.45 0.78 1.81 0.28 6.83 1.45 7.62 1.47 5.95 0.75 2.86 1.21 3.79 0.86 1.81 0.42 
Spain 1.68 0.36 1.76 0.42 1.61 0.27 4.69 0.67 5.04 0.64 4.29 0.44 0.89 0.27 0.84 0.28 0.95 0.24 
Sweden 2.92 0.72 2.83 0.84 3.01 0.57 3.17 0.43 3.40 0.37 2.90 0.34 1.60 0.37 1.74 0.39 1.41 0.23 
UK 1.40 1.02 1.47 1.22 1.32 0.74 11.62 1.51 12.48 1.40 10.63 0.93       
Note: “stand. dev.” indicates standard deviation. All rates are given in percentage points per annum. Blank cells indicate that the interest rate series is not available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Unit Root Tests             
Panel A: Nominal Lending Rates             
  mortgage rates consumer rates corporate rates 
country period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) 
Austria full -2.177 3.175 -3.138 4.966 -2.075 3.076 -4.403 9.698 -2.198 3.362 -3.321 5.514 
 pre-EMU -2.302 5.073 -3.387 5.750 -2.034 2.723 -4.216 8.898 -2.094 5.882 -3.657 6.723 
 EMU -1.116 0.768 -1.824 1.739 -1.545 1.210 -2.103 2.218 -1.235 0.973 -2.219 2.473 
Belgium full  5.755 -5.194 13.488 -2.921 6.503 -7.208 26.003 -3.170 5.738 -5.151 13.266 
 pre-EMU -2.369 4.000 -4.184 8.762 -2.050 3.235 -5.603 15.714 -3.472 7.513 -4.466 9.995 
 EMU -0.935 1.337 -3.610 6.524 -1.169 1.014 -3.714 6.941 -0.977 1.025 -3.384 5.807 
Denmark full     -2.345 2.984 -6.061 18.372 -2.596 4.938 -6.358 20.217 
 pre-EMU     -1.854 6.518 -6.553 21.491 -1.126 5.932 -7.294 26.630 
 EMU     -2.114 2.254 -4.079 8.321 -2.005 2.067 -4.022 8.089 
Finland full -2.127 2.880 -4.000 8.006 -2.025 2.907 -6.671 22.267     
 pre-EMU -1.569 1.702 -3.038 4.620 -1.843 1.997 -5.730 16.422     
 EMU -1.265 1.084 -2.812 3.991 -0.911 1.065 -3.252 5.418     
France full -0.951 0.927 -7.217 26.050 -0.950 1.770 -7.717 29.794 -1.329 0.887 -6.436 20.716 
 pre-EMU -4.606 11.670 -7.396 27.433 -2.704 3.951 -6.637 22.089 -5.805 17.901 -4.905 12.044 
 EMU -0.751 0.491 -4.344 9.434 -0.299 0.772 -4.530 10.260 -0.513 0.833 -4.552 10.359 
Germany full  5.087 -5.105 13.033 -2.030 9.368 -6.535 21.355 -2.779 6.638 -4.157 8.648 
 pre-EMU -3.781 7.406 -4.203 8.882 -1.840 4.097 -6.060 18.413 -3.972 15.969 -6.184 19.136 
 EMU -1.816 1.971 -3.401 5.807 -2.204 2.480 -2.669 3.662 -1.533 1.277 -2.057 2.118 
Greece full -1.422 1.124 -4.324 9.716 -1.518 1.155 -3.155 5.075 -2.128 2.298 -5.660 16.025 
 pre-EMU         -3.917 9.857 -4.594 10.556 
 EMU -1.422 1.124 -4.324 9.716 -1.518 1.155 -3.155 5.075 -2.942 4.824 -4.318 9.331 
Ireland full -1.977 2.016 -6.292 20.272     -2.005 2.093 -4.923 12.227 
 pre-EMU -1.913 1.836 -5.067 13.268     -1.630 1.486 -3.780 7.155 
 EMU -1.768 1.569 -3.737 7.021     -0.976 0.673 -3.072 4.881 
Italy full -0.329 0.717 -5.760 16.953     -1.210 1.517 -3.589 7.322 
 pre-EMU -2.389 10.881 -6.237 19.689     -3.887 9.707 -3.097 5.001 
 EMU -1.112 0.692 -4.286 9.575     -1.640 1.656 -2.597 4.646 
Netherlands full -2.920 6.102 -5.066 12.942     -1.528 1.169 -4.433 10.035 
 pre-EMU -3.484 7.121 -4.610 10.678     -1.702 4.750 -3.571 6.460 
 EMU -1.898 1.807 -2.776 3.953     0.392 1.585 -3.472 6.145 
Portugal full -0.859 1.571 -3.528 6.289 -1.315 1.355 -8.180 33.459 -0.973 1.777 -10.299 53.101 
 pre-EMU -1.549 3.338 -4.213 8.953 -3.918 8.006 -6.243 19.502 -4.319 9.453 -8.997 40.694 
 EMU -1.223 0.933 -2.231 2.603 -2.247 2.734 -6.860 23.596 -1.221 0.806 -4.774 11.636 
Spain full -1.513 3.310 -3.731 7.765 -0.838 1.112 -7.431 27.630 -0.869 1.504 -5.722 16.498 
 pre-EMU -1.709 1.474 -3.289 6.229 -3.215 6.092 -4.024 8.425 -1.736 1.545 -4.325 9.467 
 EMU -1.978 2.484 -2.560 3.423 -1.667 1.586 -7.595 29.174 -0.834 0.483 -3.955 7.871 
Sweden full -1.511 2.677 -6.364 20.256 -2.853 11.301 -9.292 43.197 -0.447 2.738 -7.584 28.769 
 pre-EMU -2.041 2.280 -5.125 13.199 -1.884 4.453 -7.827 30.743 -1.021 0.596 -5.857 17.194 
 EMU -1.238 0.978 -3.899 7.603 -3.356 6.455 -4.110 8.451 -4.747 12.403 -4.065 8.262 
UK full -2.568 3.667 -5.783 16.735 -1.658 1.473 -6.443 20.822     
 pre-EMU -2.049 2.098 -4.904 12.040 -1.956 1.927 -4.430 9.818     
 EMU -1.934 1.921 -3.341 5.583 -5.662 21.362 -5.432 14.763     
 
Table A2 continued: Unit Root Tests            
Panel B: Real Lending Rates             
  mortgage rates consumer rates corporate rates 
country period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) 
Austria full -2.884 4.163 -8.808 38.803 -2.813 3.997 -7.939 31.519 -2.829 4.001 -8.802 38.740 
 pre-EMU -2.815 4.290 -6.580 21.684 -2.422 3.150 -5.803 16.882 -2.541 3.562 -6.583 21.708 
 EMU -2.225 3.041 -6.062 18.390 -2.239 3.083 -5.505 15.174 -2.174 2.680 -5.925 17.582 
Belgium full -3.137 5.731 -5.864 17.319 -2.685 5.123 -6.317 20.114 -3.225 5.791 -6.632 22.175 
 pre-EMU -2.066 2.662 -4.567 10.434 -1.714 2.495 -4.841 11.729 -2.402 3.580 -4.720 11.152 
 EMU -2.878 4.450 -3.557 6.568 -2.608 4.069 -3.730 7.102 -4.319 9.931 -4.946 12.359 
Denmark full     -2.100 2.400 -6.055 18.335 -2.332 3.686 -6.408 20.540 
 pre-EMU     -1.850 4.179 -5.138 13.203 -1.279 6.515 -6.437 20.720 
 EMU     -3.641 8.188 -4.686 10.981 -3.112 6.225 -4.836 11.699 
Finland full -2.113 2.342 -5.959 17.790 -2.238 2.624 -7.103 25.270     
 pre-EMU -1.526 1.276 -3.736 7.037 -1.833 1.742 -5.078 12.911     
 EMU -2.541 3.452 -4.927 12.146 -2.291 2.693 -4.711 11.095     
France full -4.272 9.148 -8.332 34.711 -4.005 8.022 -7.714 29.757 -3.177 5.162 -7.981 31.853 
 pre-EMU -2.913 4.293 -5.539 15.339 -2.693 3.690 -5.649 15.956 -4.321 9.418 -5.101 13.013 
 EMU -3.119 4.875 -5.990 17.977 -2.914 4.252 -5.053 12.798 -1.839 1.821 -6.641 22.077 
Germany full -2.893 4.844 -6.809 23.232 -2.228 2.924 -7.170 25.742 -3.242 5.498 -7.571 28.705 
 pre-EMU -2.482 3.693 -4.913 12.074 -1.173 1.492 -5.262 13.924 -1.529 2.400 -6.075 18.509 
 EMU -1.560 1.537 -4.596 10.622 -1.560 2.418 -5.148 13.310 -2.461 3.594 -5.086 13.024 
Greece full -3.306 5.764 -4.755 11.333 -1.972 2.010 -3.056 4.750 -1.792 1.606 -4.656 10.843 
 pre-EMU         -2.513 7.096 -5.347 14.737 
 EMU -3.306 5.764 -4.755 11.333 -1.972 2.010 -3.056 4.750 -1.751 1.540 -3.885 7.626 
Ireland full -2.040 2.329 -6.024 18.143     -2.087 2.399 -6.200 19.233 
 pre-EMU -1.575 1.247 -4.787 11.535     -1.521 1.179 -4.881 12.058 
 EMU -3.392 6.816 -4.035 8.147     -3.761 8.036 -3.897 7.603 
Italy full -1.414 1.010 -6.918 24.022     -1.582 1.288 -6.488 21.140 
 pre-EMU 0.094 2.239 -4.747 11.313     0.000 2.749 -4.332 9.383 
 EMU -2.641 3.486 -5.686 16.201     -2.472 3.115 -4.894 12.021 
Netherlands full -2.313 2.705 -6.405 20.578     -1.563 1.587 -7.242 26.226 
 pre-EMU -3.477 6.171 -5.396 14.576     -1.908 2.160 -5.782 16.720 
 EMU -1.464 1.115 -4.014 8.126     -1.246 0.963 -4.641 10.769 
Portugal full -2.223 2.473 -5.717 16.351 -2.363 2.824 -7.843 30.754 -2.590 3.369 -7.994 32.055 
 pre-EMU -1.778 3.383 -4.294 9.230 -3.156 5.668 -6.131 18.794 -3.140 5.946 -6.170 19.225 
 EMU -2.491 3.428 -4.901 12.107 -3.208 5.452 -7.071 25.080 -2.623 3.566 -5.268 14.062 
Spain full -2.916 4.338 -6.253 19.572 -3.052 4.707 -7.603 28.943 -2.696 3.753 -6.945 24.127 
 pre-EMU -3.222 5.524 -3.855 7.436 -4.014 9.527 -4.870 12.431 -2.720 4.093 -4.445 9.888 
 EMU -2.850 4.074 -4.512 10.249 -2.982 4.449 -5.547 15.583 -2.865 4.112 -4.916 12.129 
Sweden full -1.576 1.243 -6.310 19.918 -1.915 1.837 -7.124 25.373 -1.860 1.827 -7.387 27.294 
 pre-EMU -0.444 1.022 -3.915 7.674 -0.648 1.067 -5.357 14.399 -1.015 0.646 -5.271 13.898 
 EMU -1.188 1.282 -5.943 17.660 -1.963 1.963 -5.242 13.737 -1.986 1.991 -5.275 13.916 
UK full -2.114 2.340 -6.196 19.195 -3.414 5.900 -6.260 19.628     
 pre-EMU -1.894 1.911 -4.910 12.188 -2.839 4.200 -5.094 13.069     
 EMU -1.250 1.386 -3.772 7.148 -4.782 12.519 -4.066 8.268     
 
Table A2 continued: Unit Root Tests 
Panel C: Nominal EU Average Lending Rates 
mortgage rates consumer rates corporate rates 
Average series  period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) 
EU     full -1.152 3.191 -4.218 9.191 -1.142 5.567 -5.932 17.633 -1.297 1.594 -3.483 6.163 
 pre-EMU -1.58 1.987 -5.419 14.871 -1.79 1.687 -5.331 14.21 -3.351 5.893 -3.8 7.295 
 EMU -1.397 1.399 -2.756 3.885 -0.711 0.557 -3.772 7.388 -1.062 0.884 -2.121 2.402 
EUaus full -1.089 2.954 -4.087 8.65 -0.922 4.823 -5.655 16.026 -1.267 1.52 -3.513 6.259 
 pre-EMU -1.611 2.352 -5.048 12.922 -1.858 1.728 -4.854 11.783 -3.57 6.741 -3.794 7.262 
 EMU -1.364 1.366 -2.763 3.905 -0.699 0.559 -3.893 7.87 -1.061 0.892 -2.144 2.464 
EUbel full -1.07 3.158 -4.25 9.355 -0.975 4.548 -6.071 18.451 -1.24 1.484 -3.528 6.312 
 pre-EMU -1.432 2.124 -5.589 15.848 -2.173 2.364 -5.358 14.361 -3.621 6.947 -3.769 7.178 
 EMU -1.349 1.302 -2.758 3.886 -0.787 0.543 -3.887 7.79 -1.048 0.863 -2.136 2.443 
EUfin full -1.12 3.291 -4.289 9.506 -1.127 5.754 -6.034 18.239     
 pre-EMU -1.478 1.919 -5.546 15.606 -1.807 1.721 -5.388 14.518     
 EMU -1.356 1.316 -2.776 3.928 -0.712 0.546 -3.825 7.611     
EUfra full -1.248 3.568 -4.722 11.409 -1.402 5.855 -6.368 20.296 -1.568 2.527 -3.55 6.439 
 pre-EMU -1.792 1.904 -5.482 15.138 -2.085 2.42 -4.947 12.267 -1.678 1.415 -4.667 10.96 
 EMU -1.569 1.72 -3.071 4.856 -1.048 0.659 -4.453 10.23 -1.228 1.052 -2.146 2.59 
EUger full -0.737 2.648 -4.212 9.515 -0.908 3.617 -6.503 21.192 -1.192 1.061 -3.829 7.419 
 pre-EMU -2.78 8.049 -5.926 18.318 -2.302 2.731 -5.45 14.864 -5.075 13.873 -3.741 7.055 
 EMU -1.122 0.923 -2.313 2.78 -0.392 0.913 -4.927 12.393 -0.871 0.771 -2.319 2.931 
EUire full -1.141 3.262 -4.224 9.208     -1.274 1.568 -3.495 6.194 
 pre-EMU -1.585 1.966 -5.432 14.976     -3.32 5.792 -3.806 7.311 
 EMU -1.328 1.305 -2.739 3.828     -1.038 0.866 -2.129 2.426 
EUita full -1.847 4.008 -4.32 9.421     -1.437 1.904 -3.906 7.637 
 pre-EMU -2.694 4.104 -5.403 14.634     -1.35 1.038 -4.677 10.97 
 EMU -1.378 1.295 -2.659 3.542     -0.616 0.719 -2.265 2.612 
EUnet full -0.992 3.012 -4.203 9.126     -1.094 1.569 -3.771 7.283 
 pre-EMU -1.548 2.836 -5.455 15.091     -4.028 8.802 -3.855 7.538 
 EMU -1.192 1.224 -2.891 4.327     -1.079 0.829 -2.324 2.817 
EUpor full -1.159 3.246 -4.294 9.509 -1.26 6.081 -5.946 17.71 -1.325 1.632 -3.54 6.386 
 pre-EMU -1.626 1.914 -5.358 14.557 -1.502 1.349 -5.428 14.733 -3.277 5.579 -3.79 7.305 
 EMU -1.319 1.266 -2.744 3.833 -0.811 0.661 -3.585 6.741 -1.032 0.846 -2.143 2.43 
EUspa full -1.18 3.106 -4.291 9.421 -1.813 8.905 -6.529 21.338 -1.303 1.403 -3.499 6.169 
 pre-EMU -1.077 1.24 -5.036 12.805 -1.727 2.71 -6.947 24.286 -4.345 9.975 -3.882 7.565 
 EMU -1.314 1.249 -2.872 4.196 -0.781 0.437 -2.653 3.606 -1.221 1.096 -2.176 2.512 
 
 
Table A2 continued: Unit Root Tests 
Panel D: Real EU Average Lending Rates 
mortgage rates consumer rates corporate rates country  
  period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) 
EU     full -3.74 7.17 -7.211 26.08 -3.149 5.211 -7.053 24.884 -3.722 6.945 -7.212 26.041 
 pre-EMU -3.033 4.622 -4.777 11.422 -2.593 3.447 -5.061 12.81 -4.248 9.042 -5.143 13.229 
 EMU -4.219 9.1 -5.188 13.476 -2.645 3.916 -4.829 11.667 -2.936 4.41 -4.852 11.78 
EUaus full -3.647 6.81 -7.183 25.877 -3.121 5.061 -6.996 24.482 -3.676 6.775 -7.228 26.152 
 pre-EMU -2.969 4.451 -4.797 11.516 -2.741 3.787 -5.018 12.595 -4.328 9.395 -5.269 13.882 
 EMU -4.166 8.876 -5.133 13.195 -2.62 3.84 -4.801 11.533 -2.92 4.357 -4.804 11.548 
EUbel full -3.547 6.423 -7.295 26.676 -3.399 5.926 -7.178 25.769 -3.647 6.688 -7.182 25.811 
 pre-EMU -2.705 3.711 -4.838 11.716 -3.008 4.553 -5.139 13.214 -4.156 8.689 -5.205 13.547 
 EMU -4.062 8.436 -5.25 13.796 -2.661 3.911 -4.9 12.008 -2.873 4.215 -4.79 11.477 
EUfin full -3.719 7.087 -7.219 26.135 -3.212 5.411 -7.032 24.738     
 pre-EMU -2.929 4.314 -4.795 11.509 -2.687 3.696 -5.111 13.066     
 EMU -4.187 8.964 -5.187 13.47 -2.624 3.872 -4.782 11.444     
EUfra full -2.664 3.976 -6.727 22.726 -2.617 3.842 -7.111 25.301 -3.485 6.073 -6.854 23.53 
 pre-EMU -2.296 2.711 -4.674 10.937 -2.361 2.881 -4.875 11.891 -4.013 8.052 -5.153 13.279 
 EMU -4.392 9.835 -5.12 13.111 -2.391 3.514 -5.056 12.786 -3.355 5.894 -4.656 10.844 
EUger full -2.548 3.256 -6.734 22.741 -3.308 5.542 -6.734 22.672 -2.964 4.595 -6.951 24.172 
 pre-EMU -1.666 1.775 -4.432 9.838 -3.214 5.187 -4.73 11.269 -3.966 8.525 -5.003 12.522 
 EMU -3.714 6.935 -5.177 13.402 -3.241 5.262 -4.543 10.332 -2.145 2.301 -4.67 10.908 
EUire full -3.749 7.221 -7.239 26.275     -3.763 7.097 -7.279 26.523 
 pre-EMU -3.121 4.894 -4.802 11.541     -4.413 9.756 -5.272 13.9 
 EMU -4.029 8.283 -5.2 13.538     -2.889 4.26 -4.852 11.784 
EUita full -4.355 9.682 -7.503 28.186     -3.701 6.859 -7.591 28.818 
 pre-EMU -3.039 4.846 -5.225 13.652     -2.256 2.632 -5.267 13.87 
 EMU -3.009 4.781 -5.141 13.273     -3.003 4.583 -5.286 13.999 
EUnet full -3.311 5.641 -7.39 27.358     -3.27 5.347 -7.466 27.908 
 pre-EMU -2.719 3.75 -4.765 11.363     -4.461 10.042 -5.322 14.163 
 EMU -4.634 10.914 -5.274 13.912     -3.047 4.801 -5.047 12.745 
EUpor full -4.001 8.187 -7.285 26.616 -3.111 5.095 -7.063 24.954 -3.724 6.955 -7.197 25.938 
 pre-EMU -3.297 5.438 -4.742 11.257 -2.194 2.601 -5.129 13.159 -3.978 7.914 -5.116 13.092 
 EMU -4.354 9.71 -5.278 13.948 -2.629 3.912 -4.812 11.589 -2.929 4.399 -4.855 11.799 
EUspa full -3.771 7.395 -7.329 26.967 -2.992 4.952 -7.184 25.84 -3.92 7.692 -7.266 26.443 
 pre-EMU -3.015 4.547 -4.847 11.765 -1.983 2.522 -5.207 13.596 -4.088 8.357 -5.205 13.548 
 EMU -3.433 6.15 -5.248 13.811 -2.282 3.208 -5.015 12.632 -2.813 4.076 -4.893 11.994 
Note: t(level) and F(level) give unit-root test-statistics for the level regression of equation (2.1) whereas t(diff) and F(diff) give the unit-root test-statistics for the regression in first differences of equation (2.2). The critical 
values for 100 observations are as follows: -3.46 (1%), -2.88 (5%), -2.57 (10%) for the t test and 8.73 (1%), 6.49 (5%), 5.47 (10%) for the F test. Blank cells indicate that the interest rate series is not available. 
Table A3: Cointegration of Lending Rates  
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates 
period nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country 
 cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF  
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
Austria full LAUS  = 2.74 + 0.50 LEU 
  (17.00)  (21.93) 
0.110 -2.066 -2.758 
(2) 
-0.113 
(-3.950) 
-68.18 2 LAUS  = 2.47 + 0.45 LEU 
  (13.81)  (12.88) 
0.434 -3.167 -2.375 
(1) 
-0.237 
(-3.154) 
165.71 0 
 pre-EMU LAUS  = 2.90 + 0.48 LEU 
  (10.99)  (14.32) 
0.127 -2.210 -2.481 
(2) 
-0.091 
(-1.701) 
-51.62 1 LAUS  = 4.73 + 0.08 LEU 
  (11.98)  (1.19) 
0.748 -3.249  -0.375 
(-2.776) 
51.68 1 
 EMU LAUS  = 0.21 + 0.93 LEU 
  (0.49)  (13.00) 
0.205 -1.723  -0.417 
(-8.797) 
-59.66 0 LAUS  = 0.76 + 0.89 LEU 
  (1.45)  (6.44) 
0.485 -2.611 -0.426 
(1-4) 
-0.385 
(-2.932) 
54.89 4 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LAUS  = 1.62 + 0.63 LEU 
  (3.82)  (5.60) 
0.973 -3.607 -0.724 
(3,4) 
-0.600 
(-3.000) 
40.58 5 
Belgium full LBEL  = 3.85 + 0.32 LEU 
  (10.77)  (6.38) 
0.073 -1.960 -1.671 
(3) 
-0.143 
(-4.141) 
74.96 4 LBEL  = 2.33 + 0.40 LEU 
  (7.80)  (6.85) 
0.253 -2.795 -3.470 
(1) 
-0.152 
(-2.547) 
218.13 0 
 pre-EMU LBEL  = 1.42 + 0.58 LEU 
  (3.42)  (11.34) 
0.190 -2.599  -0.178 
(-2.748) 
32.80 1 LBEL  = 0.59 + 0.69 LEU 
  (0.56)  (3.89) 
0.171 -1.872  -0.111 
(-1.573) 
94.77 0 
 EMU LBEL  = -1.94 + 1.36 LEU 
  (-3.85)  (15.97) 
0.323 -2.271 -2.861 
(3) 
-0.093 
(-1.065) 
0.78 1 LBEL  = 2.86 + 0.28 LEU 
  (4.17)  (1.55) 
0.532 -2.180  -0.268 
(-2.099) 
82.40 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LBEL  = -0.67 + 1.15 LEU 
  (-1.77)  (18.29) 
0.664 -3.800  -0.437 
(-3.684) 
-16.95 2        
Finland full LFIN  = 0.84 + 0.72 LEU 
  (3.16)  (19.11) 
0.070 -1.593 -2.971 
(1,3) 
-0.081 
(-2.754) 
25.48 1 LFIN  = -1.69 + 1.18 LEU 
  (-5.09)  (18.02) 
0.177 -2.103 -2.611 
(3) 
0.067 
(-1.525) 
179.06 2 
 pre-EMU LFIN  = 0.27 + 0.78 LEU 
  (0.56)  (12.67) 
0.050 -1.097 -2.680 
(2,3) 
-0.052 
(-1.553) 
-17.81 2 LFIN  = -4.45 + 1.64 LEU 
  (-3.70)  (8.11) 
0.218 -1.403  -0.027 
(-0.488) 
83.50 0 
 EMU LFIN  = -2.85 + 1.36 LEU 
  (-5.93)  (16.87) 
0.346 -1.975  -0.222 
(-2.365) 
0.95 1 LFIN  = -0.34 + 0.84 LEU 
  (-0.59)  (5.65) 
0.293 -2.608 -0.172 
(3) 
-0.262 
(-2.378) 
56.24 0 
France full LFRA  = 1.77 + 0.81 LEU 
  (17.53)  (55.81) 
0.725 -4.086 -5.615 
(1,3) 
-0.368 
(-5.713) 
8.09 1 LFRA  = 1.97 + 0.81 LEU 
  (9.71)  (19.56) 
0.408 -2.904 -2.702 
(3,4) 
-0.206 
(-2.723) 
174.62 1 
 pre-EMU LFRA  = 2.04 + 0.78 LEU 
  (13.08)  (39.20) 
0.947 -3.522 -5.023 
(1,3) 
-0.296 
(-3.182) 
-21.41 1 LFRA  = 2.94 + 0.64 LEU 
  (5.54)  (7.01) 
0.391 -2.513 -3.212 
(3) 
-0.227 
(-2.349) 
68.87 0 
 EMU LFRA  = 1.94 + 0.77 LEU 
  (5.23)  (12.21) 
0.569 -2.391 -2.663 
(3) 
-0.405 
(-4.223) 
-13.85 1 LFRA  = 1.03 + 1.05 LEU 
  (1.21)  (4.63) 
0.472 -1.862 -1.578 
(4) 
-0.363 
(-3.085) 
53.25 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LFRA  = 0.90 + 0.47 LEU 
  (2.18)  (13.52) 
0.890 -3.440 -3.565 
(3) 
-0.561 
(-4.074) 
-12.55 1        
Germany full LGER  = 3.69 + 0.31 LEU 
  (16.36)  (10.31) 
0.109 -2.027 -2.391 
(1) 
-0.136 
(-3.044) 
53.13 2 LGER  = 2.62 + 0.37 LEU 
  (12.63)  (9.49) 
0.250 -2.358 -2.757 
(3) 
-0.107 
(-1.904) 
165.15 2 
 pre-EMU LGER  = 2.40 + 0.44 LEU 
  (10.10)  (16.06) 
0.259 -3.286 -2.864 
(1) 
-0.197 
(-2.909) 
-10.73 3 LGER  = 2.93 + 0.32 LEU 
  (5.47)  (3.79) 
0.217 -1.964  -0.127 
(-1.801) 
45.06 1 
 EMU LGER  = 0.70 + 0.83 LEU 
  (0.75)  (5.40) 
0.128 -1.832 -2.311 
(1) 
0.056 
(0.740) 
24.25 0 LGER  = 1.54 + 0.66 LEU 
  (1.81)  (2.91) 
0.258 -1.292 -1.866 
(3) 
-0.073 
(-0.766) 
76.09 1 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGER  = 2.58 + 0.54 LEU 
  (3.22)  (4.16) 
0.226 -2.227  -0.058 
(-0.648) 
20.79 0 LGER  = 2.10 + 0.47 LEU 
  (2.05)  (1.66) 
0.320 -1.243 -1.485 
(3) 
-0.147 
(-1.087) 
55.98 1 
Greece EMU LGRE = 11.39 - 0.70 LEU 
  (4.55)  (-1.67) 
0.064 -1.736 0.037 
(1-4) 
0.017 
(0.874) 
-8.48 0 LGRE = -11.95 + 4.24 LEU 
  (-8.50)  (11.55) 
0.891 -3.159  -0.130 
(-1.415) 
105.27 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGRE = -8.34 + 2.37 LEU 
  (-6.96)  (12.08) 
0.573 -1.324 -3.133 
(1) 
-0.088 
(-0.637) 
-2.11 0 LGRE = -6.48 + 2.56 LEU 
  (-3.17)  (4.41) 
0.692 -2.172  -0.400 
(-2.439) 
52.95 0 
Ireland full LIRE  = 1.99 + 0.61 LEU 
  (4.35)  (9.44) 
0.071 -0.938 -1.608 
(1) 
-0.067 
(-2.405) 
119.62 1 LIRE  = -5.69 + 1.94 LEU 
  (-6.57)  (11.35) 
0.216 -2.196  -0.115 
(-2.509) 
344.86 2 
 pre-EMU LIRE  = 6.26 + 0.12 LEU 
  (14.55)  (2.13) 
0.186 -0.965 -2.264 
(1) 
-0.132 
(-2.069) 
26.36 0 LIRE  = 7.80 - 0.25 LEU 
  (3.86)  (-0.75) 
0.354 -2.047 -2.327 
(3) 
-0.182 
(-2.070) 
174.61 0 
 EMU LIRE  = 1.77 + 0.57 LEU 
  (1.53)  (2.96) 
0.176 -1.526 -2.048 
(1) 
-0.150 
(-2.258) 
47.82 0 LIRE  = -2.56 + 0.97 LEU 
  (-1.31)  (1.91) 
0.128 -1.365 -3.158 
(1-3) 
-0.084 
(-1.445) 
102.83 0 
Table A3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates  
period nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country 
 cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF  
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
Italy full LITA  = -9.43 + 2.80 LEU 
  (-9.81)  (19.14) 
0.060 -1.753 -1.719 
(1,3) 
-0.108 
(-5.732) 
117.14 1 LITA  = -2.48 + 1.82 LEU 
  (-3.73)  (13.07) 
0.126 -1.812 -2.174 
(3) 
-0.048 
(-1.743) 
198.81 1 
 pre-EMU LITA  = -5.14 + 2.30 LEU 
  (-5.79)  (18.46) 
0.143 -2.572  -0.054 
(-0.964) 
62.63 1 LITA  = 2.08 + 1.06 LEU 
  (1.19)  (3.34) 
0.067 0.230 -0.494 
(3) 
0.014 
(0.370) 
76.90 1 
 EMU LITA  = 2.02 + 0.71 LEU 
  (2.85)  (5.89) 
0.220 -1.704 -1.837 
(3) 
-0.263 
(-3.832) 
14.57 1 LITA  = 4.20 - 0.07 LEU 
  (6.81)  (-0.41) 
0.523 -2.600  -0.274 
(-2.483) 
78.39 0 
Netherlands full LNET  = 3.68 + 0.35 LEU 
  (17.50)  (11.80) 
0.126 -2.348 -2.320 
(1) 
-0.175 
(-4.229) 
41.84 1 LNET  = -1.39 + 1.00 LEU 
  (-2.97)  (11.07) 
0.173 -1.934 -2.264 
(3) 
-0.075 
(-1.829) 
217.25 2 
 pre-EMU LNET  = 2.84 + 0.43 LEU 
  (10.57)  (13.06) 
0.240 -3.376 -2.852 
(1,4) 
-0.198 
(-2.759) 
7.86 0 LNET  = -1.37 + 0.98 LEU 
  (-2.83)  (12.40) 
0.591 -2.656  -0.216 
(-1.392) 
86.40 1 
 EMU LNET  = -0.07 + 1.00 LEU 
  (-0.12)  (10.78) 
0.182 -1.149 -2.411 
(1,3) 
-0.036 
(-0.352) 
0.081 1 LNET  = -5.06 +  1.94 LEU 
  (-2.07)  (3.14) 
0.245 -1.651  -0.061 
(-1.187) 
92.53 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LNET  = 1.60 + 0.73 LEU 
  (2.45)  (6.83) 
0.224 -1.422 -1.861 
(3) 
-0.266 
(-1.945) 
-10.00 3 LNET  = -0.59 + 0.45 LEU 
  (-0.28)  (0.78) 
0.653 -4.643  -0.586 
(-3.685) 
35.46 1 
Portugal full LPOR  = -6.34 + 2.06 LEU 
  (-17.75)  (40.50) 
0.113 -1.694 -1.979 
(3) 
-0.071 
(-2.838) 
29.62 3 LPOR  = -6.24 + 2.25 LEU 
  (-14.92)  (27.21) 
0.370 -3.005 -3.482 
(1) 
-0.052 
(-1.087) 
200.40 4 
 pre-EMU LPOR  = -4.70 + 1.88 LEU 
  (-8.61)  (27.02) 
0.123 -1.542  -0.074 
(-2.272) 
-8.22 2 LPOR  = -10.95 + 3.03 LEU 
  (-8.36)  (13.73) 
0.338 -2.213 -2.299 
(2) 
-0.063 
(-0.991) 
91.87 3 
 EMU LPOR  = -1.79 + 1.25 LEU 
  (-2.42)  (10.09) 
0.188 -1.739 -1.955 
(3) 
-0.273 
(-4.391) 
4.94 0 LPOR  = -2.62 + 1.33 LEU 
  (-3.11)  (6.07) 
0.615 -2.632  -0.033 
(-0.398) 
63.02 1 
Spain full LSPA  = -4.95 + 1.71 LEU 
  (-15.60)  (38.00) 
0.116 -1.550 -2.323 
(2) 
-0.035 
(-1.940) 
-39.34 2 LSPA  = -2.87 + 1.38 LEU 
  (-8.60)  (21.29) 
0.243 -2.206  -0.120 
(-2.545) 
179.26 3 
 pre-EMU LSPA  = -6.71 + 1.93 LEU 
  (11.59)  (26.14) 
0.138 -0.473 -1.349 
(2) 
-0.065 
(-2.439) 
-32.93 1 LSPA  = -4.75 + 1.70 LEU 
  (-6.00)  (12.89) 
0.348 -2.319  -0.141 
(-1.967) 
59.36 2 
 EMU LSPA  = -1.56 + 1.16 LEU 
  (-2.57)  (11.52) 
0.182 -1.388 -2.047 
(1) 
-0.210 
(-5.106) 
-64.59 1 LSPA  = 1.93 + 0.15 LEU 
  (2.33)  (0.70) 
0.430 -2.099 -2.565 
(1) 
-0.296 
(-3.016) 
68.15 3 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LSPA  = -1.39 + 1.14 LEU 
  (-0.72)  (2.09) 
0.569 -1.204  -0.321 
(-1.488) 
39.35 1 
Sweden full LSWE  = 1.26 + 0.89 LEU 
  (3.93)  (18.78) 
0.243 -2.163 -2.679 
(3) 
-0.162 
(-2.297) 
84.69 2 LSWE  = 1.30 + 0.95 LEU 
  (2.29)  (8.27) 
0.135 -1.282 -1.961 
(3) 
-0.073 
(-1.558) 
159.36 2 
 pre-EMU LSWE  = -0.66 + 1.13 LEU 
  (-1.90)  (24.42) 
0.677 -2.082 -2.191 
(3) 
-0.322 
(-1.961) 
38.04 0 LSWE  = -4.00 + 1.83 LEU 
  (-2.36)  (6.24) 
0.154 -0.640 -1.395 
(3) 
-0.078 
(-1.340) 
54.18 2 
 EMU LSWE  = 4.00 + 0.45 LEU 
  (4.90)  (3.28) 
0.218 -1.686 -2.292 
(3) 
-0.313 
(-2.632) 
10.07 3 LSWE  = -3.23 + 2.17 LEU 
  (-3.03)  (8.03) 
0.746 -2.266  0.045 
(0.299) 
63.76 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LSWE  = 6.46 + 0.06 LEU 
  (7.06)  (0.39) 
0.392 -3.010  -0.228 
(-1.701) 
3.28 2        
UK full LUKD = 2.76 + 0.64 LEU 
  (10.52)  (17.20) 
0.116 -1.664 -2.335 
(1,4) 
-0.074 
(-1.925) 
71.84 2 LUKD =  4.43 + 0.21 LEU 
  (15.65)  (3.81) 
0.184 -1.860  -0.082 
(-1.585) 
162.84 3 
 pre-EMU LUKD = 4.00 + 0.50 LEU 
  (12.17)  (12.02) 
0.255 -2.361 -2.035 
(4) 
-0.210 
(-2.871) 
15.51 1 LUKD =  5.35 + 0.05 LEU 
  (8.08)  (0.49) 
0.340 -1.930  -0.159 
(-1.835) 
66.36 1 
 EMU LUKD = 4.39 + 0.34 LEU 
  (4.61)  (2.13) 
0.075 0.721 -1.299 
(1) 
-0.048 
(-0.600) 
3.46 2 LUKD =  1.76 + 0.92 LEU 
  (1.75)  (3.50) 
0.107 -2.175 -2.080 
(3) 
-0.106 
(-1.557) 
50.98 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LUKD = 2.56 + 0.57 LEU 
  (3.26)  (4.48) 
0.546 -2.906 -3.386 
(1,4) 
-0.490 
(-3.284) 
-17.43 2 LUKD = - 0.81 + 1.67 LEU 
  (-1.24)  (9.56) 
0.642 -2.682 -1.956 
(4) 
-0.091 
(-0.671) 
42.36 1 
 
Table A3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates 
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates 
nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country period 
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
Austria full LAUS  = 0.80 + 0.60 LEU 
  (3.12)  (27.26) 
0.155 -2.140 -2.581 
(2,3) 
-1.778 
(-3.842) 
-4.29 5 LAUS  = 1.00 + 0.62 LEU 
  (3.50)  (18.34) 
0.504 -3.436 -2.608 
(1) 
-0.197 
(-2.501) 
166.46 0 
 pre-EMU LAUS  = 1.70 + 0.60 LEU 
  (4.79)  (18.74) 
0.231 -2.793  -0.141 
(-1.591) 
-12.38 3 LAUS  = 3.82 + 0.32 LEU 
  (6.99)  (5.57) 
0.678 -3.115  -0.292 
(-2.369) 
57.78 0 
 EMU LAUS  = -6.52 + 1.47 LEU 
  (-7.79)  (16.22) 
0.295 -1.372  0.057 
(0.496) 
-27.32 1 LAUS  = -0.86 + 0.86 LEU 
  (-1.10)  (8.11) 
0.737 -2.964 -3.593 
(1,3,4) 
-0.428 
(-3.362) 
43.37 5 
Belgium full LBEL  = -1.05 + 0.86 LEU 
  (-1.48)  (12.43) 
0.240 -3.218  -0.177 
(-3.094) 
221.03 1 LBEL  = -2.71 + 1.03 LEU 
  (-3.88)  (12.49) 
0.278 -3.282  -0.119 
(-2.144) 
260.70 0 
 pre-EMU LBEL  = -4.58 + 0.16 LEU 
  (-3.71)  (10.41) 
0.331 -2.547  -0.224 
(-2.537) 
117.84 1 LBEL  = -9.21 + 1.70 LEU 
  (-4.63)  (8.07) 
0.380 -2.575  -0.085 
(-1.075) 
134.17 0 
 EMU LBEL  = -2.37 + 1.03 LEU 
  (-1.20)  (4.86) 
0.231 -2.130  -0.084 
(-1.059) 
27.46 1 LBEL  = -0.13 + 0.70 LEU 
  (-0.16)  (6.22) 
0.641 -2.640  -0.205 
(-1.495) 
60.53 1 
Denmark full LDEN  = 5.80 + 0.44 LEU 
  (13.13)  (9.88) 
0.314 -2.423  -0.214 
(-3.565) 
84.84 2 LDEN  = 3.78 + 0.53 LEU 
  (6.25)  (7.22) 
0.227 -2.094  -0.109 
(-1.817) 
164.55 2 
 pre-EMU LDEN  = 7.01 + 0.33 LEU 
  (13.07)  (6.44) 
0.210 -1.292  -0.067 
(-0.897) 
-18.17 2 LDEN  = 5.67 + 0.33 LEU 
  (3.96)  (2.10) 
0.167 -0.916  -0.050 
(-0.642) 
50.99 0 
 EMU LDEN  = -4.88 + 1.61 LEU 
  (-4.21)  (12.69) 
0.664 -2.637 -2.545 
(3) 
-0.119 
(-0.838) 
27.03 1 LDEN  = 7.85 - 0.05 LEU 
  (5.11)  (-0.23) 
0.322 -1.925 -2.030 
(3) 
-0.177 
(-1.935) 
66.94 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LDEN  = 6.67 + 0.17 LEU 
  (3.09)  (0.55) 
0.829 -2.781  -0.488 
(-2.111) 
32.34 2 
Finland full LFIN  = 1.22 + 0.82 LEU 
  (2.82)  (19.17) 
0.388 -3.092  -0.132 
(-1.913) 
191.93 0 LFIN  = -5.30 + 1.27 LEU 
  (-12.31)  (24.96) 
0.466 -3.344  -0.129 
(-1.798) 
221.58 1 
 pre-EMU LFIN  = -1.95 + 0.87 LEU 
  (-3.14)  (15.42) 
0.737 -3.325  -0.312 
(-2.587) 
96.89 0 LFIN  = -9.46 + 1.71 LEU 
  (-11.12)  (18.79) 
1.091 -4.005 -4.163 
(1) 
-0.531 
(-2.647) 
105.32 5 
 EMU LFIN  = -10.79 + 1.87 LEU 
  (-5.92)  (9.44) 
0.182 -1.034 -1.527 
(4) 
0.146 
(1.822) 
28.24 0 LFIN  = -0.60 + 0.64 LEU 
  (-0.59)  (4.62) 
0.275 -1.902 -1.847 
(3) 
-0.145 
(-1.372) 
60.68 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LFIN  = -22.63 + 4.57 LEU 
  (-4.95)  (6.42) 
0.257 -2.018  0.227 
(2.168) 
15.14 0        
France full LFRA  = -0.33 + 0.95 LEU 
  (-1.33)  (39.54) 
0.388 -2.904 -3.359 
(3) 
-0.198 
(-4.087) 
31.07 1 LFRA  = 0.80 + 0.86 LEU 
  (2.81)  (25.62) 
0.470 -2.998 -3.731 
(3) 
-0.175 
(-1.862) 
184.42 1 
 pre-EMU LFRA  = 0.79 + 0.86 LEU 
  (2.18)  (26.40) 
0.541 -2.686 -3.176 
(3) 
-0.320 
(-3.816) 
7.39 2 LFRA  = 1.72 + 0.76 LEU 
  (2.83)  (11.82) 
0.586 -2.997 -3.461 
(3) 
-0.306 
(-2.377) 
78.50 1 
 EMU LFRA  = 2.82 + 0.60 LEU 
  (4.26)  (8.59) 
0.500 -1.713  -0.196 
(-1.994) 
-34.18 1 LFRA  = 0.65 + 0.87 LEU 
  (0.68)  (6.68) 
0.837 -1.399 -1.343 
(3,4) 
-0.114 
(-0.954) 
59.67 1 
real postbreak 
EMU 
       LFRA  = 3.34 + 0.44 LEU 
  (0.97)  (0.92) 
0.924 -1.910  -0.554 
(-1.604) 
25.79 0 
Germany full LGER  = 6.49 + 0.48 LEU 
  (53.56)  (37.70) 
0.216 -2.880  -0.009 
(-2.089) 
-55.68 2 LGER  = 4.95 + 0.62 LEU 
  (18.61)  (17.57) 
0.275 -2.207  -0.182 
(-2.778) 
168.49 2 
 pre-EMU LGER  = 6.16 + 0.51 LEU 
  (35.01)  (30.38) 
0.358 -3.204  -0.068 
(-0.877) 
-37.38 2 LGER  = 5.84 + 0. 52 LEU 
  (11.42)  (8.68) 
0.301 -1.447  -0.107 
(-1.239) 
44.37 2 
 EMU LGER  = 5.67 + 0.59 LEU 
  (8.30)  (7.05) 
0.152 -0.632  -0.057 
(-1.230) 
-81.12 2 LGER  = 2.76 + 0.97 LEU 
  (2.52)  (5.58) 
0.256 -1.071  -0.161 
(-1.360) 
79.67 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGER  = 9.86 + 0.10 LEU 
  (25.77)  (2.25) 
0.581 -2.870  -0.411 
(-4.322) 
-80.58 3 LGER  = 7.29 + 0.20 LEU 
  (4.99)  (0.80) 
0.600 -2.209  -0.352 
(-2.233) 
57.86 0 
Greece EMU LGRE = 101.93 - 9.39 LEU 
  (8.67)  (-7.30) 
0.109 -0.446  -0.079 
(-2.383) 
97.06 0 LGRE = -29.22 + 5.85 LEU 
  (-3.44)  (5.00) 
0.178 -1.221 -0.455 
(4) 
-0.068 
(-2.082) 
127.57 1 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGRE = -17.31 + 3.16 LEU 
  (-2.80)  (4.76) 
0.609 -2.480  -0.256 
(-1.806) 
11.02 1 LGRE = 5.97 + 0.50 LEU 
  (0.57)  (0.34) 
0.157 -4.116  -0.271 
(-4.504) 
64.96 0 
Table A3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates  
period nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country 
 cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF  
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
Portugal full LPOR  = -12.86 + 2.50 LEU 
  (-14.72)  (28.70) 
0.701 -4.380  -0.384 
(-4.792) 
331.33 0 LPOR  = -9.43 + 2.22 LEU 
  (-7.34)  (14.48) 
0.377 -2.956  -0.134 
(-2.434) 
360.87 0 
 pre-EMU LPOR  = -11.75 + 2.41 LEU 
  (-7.31)  (16.15) 
0.604 -2.898  -0.309 
(-2.948) 
166.42 0 LPOR  = -13.52 + 2.68 LEU 
  (-3.79)  (6.93) 
0.273 -1.430  -0.080 
(-1.072) 
177.57 1 
 EMU LPOR  = -4.31 + 1.54 LEU 
  (-1.59)  (5.21) 
1.417 -4.648  -0.767 
(-4.992) 
114.24 0 LPOR  = 4.75 + 0.26 LEU 
  (2.99)  (1.17) 
1.193 -4.050 -2.387 
(1) 
-0.443 
(-2.781) 
114.89 2 
Spain full LSPA  = -13.72 + 2.35 LEU 
  (-23.79)  (41.23) 
0.456 -4.073 -3.786 
(3) 
-0.285 
(-4.226) 
208.17 0 LSPA  = -7.18 + 1.67 LEU 
  (-8.98)  (17.97) 
0.365 -3.084  -0.111 
(-2.096) 
246.93 2 
 pre-EMU LSPA  = -13.26 + 2.32 LEU 
  (-12.54)  (23.55) 
0.292 -2.570 -2.253 
(3) 
-0.338 
(-5.702) 
56.09 3 LSPA  = -5.23 + 1.49 LEU 
  (-3.19)  (8.52) 
0.255 -1.538  -0.173 
(-2.462) 
95.63 2 
 EMU LSPA  = -7.24 + 1.65 LEU 
  (-4.50)  (9.55) 
1.221 -4.323  -0.517 
(-3.226) 
68.38 0 LSPA  = 2.73 + 0.32 LEU 
  (1.96)  (1.79) 
0.736 -3.287  -0.434 
(-3.817) 
93.02 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LSPA  = -2.58 + 1.16 LEU 
  (-0.94)  (4.00) 
1.503 -3.961 -2.289 
(2,4) 
-0.803 
(-4.528) 
34.56 1        
Sweden full LSWE = -5.89 + 1.37 LEU 
  (-12.16)  (28.16) 
0.204 -1.988 -3.040 
(3) 
-0.086 
(-2.119) 
28.83 1 LSPA  = -4.94 + 1.39 LEU 
  (-6.74)  (15.50) 
0.231 -1.396 -2.029 
(3) 
-0.153 
(-2.728) 
165.04 2 
 pre-EMU LSWE  = -5.83 + 1.37 LEU 
  (-7.39)  (18.39) 
0.250 -1.471 -2.423 
(3) 
-0.152 
(-2.310) 
9.59 1 LSWE  = -11.64 + 2.10 LEU 
  (-6.79)  (11.08) 
0.293 -1.705  -0.200 
(-2.157) 
79.96 1 
 EMU LSWE  = 3.36 + 0.35 LEU 
  (5.45)  (5.18) 
0.418 -1.896 -3.102 
(3,4) 
-0.267 
(-2.740) 
-55.62 2 LSWE  = -2.85 + 1.10 LEU 
  (-1.77)  (4.98) 
0.319 -0.147  0.060 
(0.622) 
48.38 2 
UK  full LUKD  = 4.75 + 1.26 LEU 
  (6.18)  (16.60) 
0.166 -2.102  -0.143 
(-3.468) 
200.69 0 LUKD  = 8.68 + 0.84 LEU 
  (20.10)  (16.44) 
0.472 -3.581  -0.241 
(-3.404) 
213.68 1 
 pre-EMU LUKD  = 10.65 + 0.76 LEU 
  (16.41)  (12.83) 
0.336 -2.056  -0.203 
(-2.387) 
64.32 1 LUKD  = 13.19 + 0.38 LEU 
  (15.87)  (4.23) 
0.503 -2.697  -0.396 
(-3.611) 
77.37 2 
 EMU LUKD  = 17.00 - 0.14 LEU 
  (9.63)  (-0.72) 
0.741 -3.384  -0.356 
(-3.086) 
56.79 1 LUKD  = 12.03 + 0.35 LEU 
  (14.35)  (3.04) 
0.877 -3.236  -0.465 
(-3.423) 
63.32 1 
 
  Table A3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates 
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates 
nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country Period 
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF(k) 
ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags 
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF(k) 
ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags 
Austria full LAUS  = 2.14 + 0.65 LEU 
  (18.25)  (38.71) 
0.168 -2.243 -2.266 
(2) 
0.017 
(0.241) 
-1.83 0 LAUS  = 1.94 + 0.65 LEU 
  (8.86)  (14.67) 
0.509 -3.480 -2.466 
(1) 
-0.201 
(-2.497) 
161.04 1 
 pre-EMU LAUS  = 2.43 + 0.61 LEU 
  (12.08)  (23.28) 
0.142 -2.320  -0.133 
(-1.709) 
-56.84 1 LAUS  = 4.03 + 0.28 LEU 
  (8.49)  (3.36) 
0.894 -3.533 -3.163 
(2) 
-0.422 
(-3.264) 
51.95 0 
 EMU LAUS  = 1.41 + 0.77 LEU 
  (6.47)  (21.90) 
0.281 -1.823  0.159 
(1.096) 
-6.81 0 LAUS  = -0.21 + 1.18 LEU 
  (-0.32)  (7.35) 
0.541 -2.468  -0.245 
(-1.944) 
63.29 1 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LAUS  = 0.93 + 0.85 LEU 
  (1.74)  (6.29) 
1.111 -3.592 -3.716 
(3,4) 
-0.543 
(-2.150) 
45.84 3 
Belgium full LBEL  = 3.23 + 0.20 LEU 
  (8.21)  (3.61) 
0.098 -2.246 -2.452 
(1,3) 
-0.140 
(-3.578) 
87.15 3 LBEL  = 1.08 + 0.36 LEU 
  (3.11)  (5.23) 
0.230 -2.764 -2.958 
(1) 
-0.136 
(-2.415) 
189.95 1 
 pre-EMU LBEL  = 3.18 + 0.18 LEU 
  (6.48)  (2.88) 
0.142 -3.568  -0.168 
(-3.381) 
18.82 0 LBEL  = 3.31 - 0.02 LEU 
  (2.60)  (-0.09) 
0.168 -2.156 -2.346 
(1) 
-0.085 
(-1.419) 
71.57 1 
 EMU LBEL  = -2.04 + 1.08 LEU 
  (-3.45)  (11.45) 
0.245 -1.801  0.167 
(1.839) 
37.01 0 LBEL  = 0.42 + 0.51 LEU 
  (0.84)  (4.16) 
0.813 -2.857 -3.123 
(3) 
-0.626 
(-3.892) 
56.79 2 
Denmark  full LDEN  = 1.74 + 0.63 LEU 
  (4.95)  (12.19) 
0.220 -2.167 -2.182 
(3) 
-0.135 
(-2.360) 
93.53 1 LDEN  = 0.84 + 0.64 LEU 
  (1.61)  (6.05) 
0.162 -2.043 -2.623 
(3,4) 
-0.128 
(-2.290) 
162.67 1 
 pre-EMU LDEN  = 1.21 + 0.67 LEU 
  (2.39)  (9.76) 
0.244 -1.092 -0.428 
(3) 
-0.047 
(-0.457) 
21.29 1 LDEN  = 0.16 + 0.75 LEU 
  (0.11)  (2.84) 
0.151 -1.221  -0.065 
(-0.788) 
52.46 1 
 EMU LDEN  = -1.13 + 1.13 LEU 
  (-4.46)  (27.82) 
1.175 -3.664 -3.508 
(3) 
-0.786 
(-4.526) 
1.57 1 LDEN  = -0.31 + 0.92 LEU 
  (-0.18)  (2.16) 
0.138 -0.983  -0.069 
(-0.827) 
74.50 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LDEN  = 2.11 + 0.48 LEU 
  (1.74)  (1.63) 
0.998 -5.887  -0.914 
(-5.194) 
22.06 0 
France full LFRA  = -3.20 + 1.26 LEU 
  (-11.38)  (32.52) 
0.355 -2.890 -3.332 
(3) 
-0.117 
(-1.924) 
127.96 1 LFRA  = -1.15 + 1.11 LEU 
  (-3.08)  (15.07) 
0.252 -3.273 -3.253 
(3) 
-0.164 
(-2.623) 
211.13 0 
 pre-EMU LFRA  = -4.95 + 1.47 LEU 
  (-10.68)  (25.02) 
0.389 -2.079 -2.844 
(3) 
-0.212 
(-0.268) 
36.10 2 LFRA  = -9.69 + 2.56 LEU 
  (-7.92)  (12.14) 
0.574 -3.457  -0.186 
(-1.991) 
82.84 0 
 EMU LFRA  = -1.73 + 1.05 LEU 
  (-4.18)  (16.47) 
0.825 -3.107  -0.172 
(-1.041) 
51.66 0 LFRA  = -0.79 + 1.05 LEU 
  (-1.20)  (6.67) 
0.713 -2.787 -2.933 
(3) 
-0.402 
(-2.298) 
85.11 0 
Germany full LGER  = 7.40 + 0.11 LEU 
  (31.35)  (2.96) 
0.027 -0.742 -2.082 
(2,3,4) 
-0.032 
(-1.637) 
-27.92 1 LGER  = 6.25 + 0.09 LEU 
  (39.77)  (2.58) 
0.462 -3.220 -2.701 
(4) 
-0.241 
(-3.277) 
174.18 0 
 pre-EMU LGER  = 6.17 + 0.24 LEU 
  (38.73)  (11.30) 
0.158 -2.890 -2.891 
(1,3,4) 
-0.147 
(-2.166) 
-50.12 2 LGER  = 6.68 + 0. 01 LEU 
  (14.91)  (0.12) 
0.331 -1.705  -0.190 
(-2.131) 
46.93 1 
 EMU LGER  = 3.71 + 0.86 LEU 
  (10.18)  (12.53) 
0.113 -0.119  -0.042 
(-0.776) 
-44.79 1 LGER  = 5.73 + 0.26 LEU 
  (12.06)  (1.68) 
0.544 -2.501  -0.334 
(-2.663) 
75.90 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGER  = 5.82 + 0.50 LEU 
  (12.22)  (5.96) 
0.122 -2.653  -0.378 
(-4.553) 
-28.80 0        
Greece EMU LGRE  = 29.80 - 2.96 LEU 
  (8.05)  (-4.96) 
0.043 0.510 0.133 
(1) 
-0.062 
(-2.493) 
57.05 3 LGRE  = -9.44 + 4.44 LEU 
  (-1.62)  (3.10) 
0.107 -0.920  -0.005 
(-0.191) 
112.06 1 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LGRE  = 3.56 + 0.95 LEU 
  (0.59)  (1.04) 
0.038 -3.227 -1.805 
(2,3,4) 
-0.055 
(-2.201) 
26.71 0 LGRE  = -4.65 + 2.50 LEU 
  (-1.92)  (4.07) 
0.529 -4.469  -0.274 
(-2.507) 
49.50 0 
Ireland full LIRE  = 6.44 + 0.45 LEU 
  (17.52)  (8.62) 
0.101 -1.445 -1.935 
(1) 
-0.077 
(-2.152) 
98.75 1 LIRE  = -2.58 + 2.01 LEU 
  (-2.67)  (10.29) 
0.255 -2.494  -0.123 
(-2.461) 
343.71 0 
 pre-EMU LIRE  = 9.32 + 0.09 LEU 
  (18.16)  (1.40) 
0.212 -0.693 -1.907 
(1) 
-0.128 
(-1.622) 
47.31 1 LIRE  = 11.75 - 0.46 LEU 
  (4.56)  (-1.01) 
0.333 -1.982 -2.251 
(3) 
-0.199 
(-2.317) 
170.60 1 
 EMU LIRE  = 2.74 + 1.03 LEU 
  (14.74)  (34.07) 
0.756 -3.079  -0.712 
(-4.220) 
-6.15 0 LIRE  = 0.42 + 1.14 LEU 
  (0.27)  (2.97) 
0.199 -1.412 -3.207 
(3,4) 
-0.165 
(-2.242) 
87.03 2 
Table A3 continued: Cointegration of Lending Rates  
period nominal lending rates real lending rates 
ECM ECM 
Country 
 cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF 
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
cointegrating  vector 
(t-statistics) 
DW DF ADF  
(k) ECT 
(t-stat.) 
AIC no. of 
lags  
Italy full LITA  = -7.73 + 2.47 LEU 
  (-5.41)  (11.39) 
0.022 -0.640 -1.281 
(2,3) 
-0.021 
(-2.718) 
-7.02 1 LITA  = -3.50 + 1.95 LEU 
  (-4.27)  (11.32) 
0.158 -1.996  -0.040 
(-1.744) 
152.87 2 
 pre-EMU LITA  = -4.23 + 2.14 LEU 
  (-4.93)  (17.29) 
0.086 -1.812 -1.040 
(3) 
-0.016 
(-0.628) 
-16.87 0 LITA  = 5.72 + 0.29LEU 
  (3.96)  (1.07) 
0.049 1.041 -0.063 
(3) 
0.018 
(0.536) 
37.45 2 
 EMU LITA  = 1.36 + 0.76 LEU 
  (4.61)  (16.15) 
0.272 -4.019  -0.321 
(-4.367) 
-47.13 1 LITA  = 1.03 + 0.69 LEU 
  (1.38)  (3.82) 
0.500 -2.456  -0.290 
(-2.821) 
62.48 0 
Netherlands full LNET  = 4.02 - 0.01 LEU 
  (8.08)  (-0.16) 
0.062 -1.220 -2.537 
(3,4) 
-0.059 
(-2.359) 
94.74 1 LNET  = -1.18 + 0.50 LEU 
  (-2.12)  (4.87) 
0.180 -1.504  -0.053 
(-1.143) 
212.84 4 
 pre-EMU LNET  = 2.89 + 0.09 LEU 
  (5.77)  (1.41) 
0.060 -2.064  -0.070 
(-1.959) 
-6.75 0 LNET  = -0.63 + 0.41 LEU 
  (-0.74)  (2.95) 
0.416 -2.036  -0.181 
(-1.696) 
89.03 0 
 EMU LNET  = -4.42 + 1.37 LEU 
  (-10.32)  (20.54) 
0.942 -2.663  -0.265 
(-1.484) 
44.82 1 LNET  = -2.37 + 0.78 LEU 
  (-0.98)  (1.41) 
0.160 -0.899  -0.024 
(-0.427) 
89.18 2 
 postbreak 
EMU 
       LNET  = -5.41 + 1.22 LEU 
  (-2.54)  (2.49) 
0.888 -4.456  -0.445 
(-3.275) 
35.39 0 
Portugal full LPOR  = -9.30 + 2.52 LEU 
  (-12.73)  (24.07) 
0.583 -1.824 -1.575 
(1,3) 
-0.138 
(-3.739) 
212.86 2 LPOR  = -9.97 + 3.06 LEU 
  (-13.65)  (20.83) 
0.418 -3.096  -0.043 
(-0.885) 
284.77 0 
 pre-EMU LPOR  = -7.33 + 2.34 LEU 
  (-16.14)  (39.03) 
1.401 -4.788  -0.717 
(-5.032) 
102.33 0 LPOR  = -15.82 + 4.12 LEU 
  (-8.22)  (12.04) 
0.504 -2.018 -2.396 
(3) 
-0.178 
(-1.893) 
140.06 1 
 EMU LPOR  = 0.81 + 0.78 LEU 
  (1.85)  (11.10) 
0.702 -3.543  -0.434 
(-3.530) 
31.81 3 LPOR  = -0.17 + 0.65 LEU 
  (-0.12)  (1.84) 
0.269 -1.623  -0.066 
(-0.872) 
88.67 0 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LPOR  = 0.16 + 0.87 LEU 
  (0.46)  (15.68) 
1.257 -4.104  -0.660 
(-3.443) 
30.62 2        
Spain full LSPA  = -7.10 + 1.89 LEU 
  (-20.23)  (38.13) 
0.303 -2.730 -2.176 
(1) 
-0.058 
(-0.920) 
157.78 3 LSPA  = -5.08 + 1.64 LEU 
  (-12.57)  (20.94) 
0.494 -3.687  -0.229 
(-3.269) 
233.74 1 
 pre-EMU LSPA  = -8.02 + 2.03 LEU 
  (-16.63)  (32.12) 
0.354 -2.511  -0.201 
(-2.317) 
53.03 1 LSPA  = -5.28 + 1.69 LEU 
  (-4.76)  (8.84) 
0.406 -2.768  -0.241 
(-3.064) 
76.31 1 
 EMU LSPA  = -2.53 + 1.15 LEU 
  (-6.87)  (19.93) 
1.500 -4.793  -0.531 
(-2.559) 
63.15 0 LSPA  = -1.06 + 0.69 LEU 
  (-1.07)  (2.98) 
0.752 -2.858  -0.393 
(-2.753) 
104.28 0 
Sweden full LSWE  = -3.70 + 1.45 LEU 
  (-8.03)  (22.26) 
0.101 -1.436 -3.092 
(3) 
-0.046 
(-1.981) 
39.70 0 LSWE  = -2.38 + 1.14 LEU 
  (-6.61)  (15.74) 
0.173 -1.433 -1.790 
(3) 
-0.059 
(-1.200) 
189.83 1 
 pre-EMU LSWE  = -4.39 + 1.56 LEU 
  (-7.98)  (21.71) 
0.224 -1.442 -2.507 
(3) 
-0.131 
(-3.138) 
8.69 1 LSWE  = -9.52 + 2.74 LEU 
  (-6.90)  (11.26) 
0.284 -1.616  -0.098 
(-1.416) 
92.25 1 
 EMU LSWE  = 2.82 + 0.36 LEU 
  (17.94)  (14.34) 
0.501 -2.116  -0.185 
(-1.257) 
-39.17 1 LSWE  = -2.16 + 1.41 LEU 
  (-1.44)  (3.90) 
0.244 -0.075  0.314 
(2.439) 
46.79 3 
 postbreak 
EMU 
LSWE  = 2.94 + 0.35 LEU 
  (17.17)  (12.75) 
0.515 -2.426 -2.622 
(3) 
-0.162 
(-1.003) 
-31.57 0        
For the cointegrating vector, L indicates lending rates and the subscripts indicate the country. EU indicates the average of all countries except the country under investigation. Furthermore, t-statistics are given in parentheses and the 
following test statistics are reported: Durbin Watson (DW), Dickey Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey Fuller with optimal lag length selected by AIC criteria based on all models up to 4 lags (ADF(k4)) or 12 lags (ADF(k12)). The 
critical values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for 100 observations are as follows: 0.511, 0.386, and 0.322 for DW, 4.07, 3.37, and 3.03 for DF, 3.77, 3.17, and 2.84 for ADF(k). 
Figure 1: Nominal Interest Rates
Panel A: Mortgage Rates
Panel B: Consumer Rates
Panel C: Corporate Rates
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Figure 2: Real Interest Rates
Panel A: Mortgage Rates
Panel B: Consumer Rates
Panel C: Corporate Rates
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Figure 3: Interest Rate Spreads
Panel A: Mortgage Rates
Panel B: Consumer Rates
Panel C: Corporate Rates
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
AUS
BEL
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE
IRE
ITA
NET
POR
SPA
SWE
UKD
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
AUS
BEL
DEN
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE
POR
SPA
SWE
UKD
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
AUS
BEL
DEN
FRA
GER
GRE
IRE
ITA
NET
POR
SPA
SWE
Figure 4: Speed of Adjustment in Cointegration of Nominal National Interest Rates versus EU Average
Panel A: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Mortgage Lending Rates
Panel B: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Consumer Lending Rates
Panel C: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Corporate Lending Rates
Note:  ECTs are shown only when significant cointegration relationship was found. Striped bars indicate that 
ECT is not significantly differently from zero (10% level) with the following patterns: horizontal for full period.
diagonal bottom left to top right for pre-EMU period, and diagonal top left to bottom right for EMU period.
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Figure 5: Speed of Adjustment in Cointegration of Real National Interest Rates versus EU Average
Panel A: Error Correction Terms for Real Mortgage Lending Rates
Panel B: Error Correction Terms for Real Consumer Lending Rates
Panel C: Error Correction Terms for Real Corporate Lending Rates
See notes to Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Coefficients for the Optimally Extended Pass-Through Model in the Pre-EMU Period
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates
Note: Only significant impact multipliers and ECT coefficients are shown.
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Figure 7: Coefficients for the Optimally Extended Pass-Through Model in the EMU Period
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates
Note: Only significant impact multipliers and ECT coefficients are shown.
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Figure A1: Rolling Chow Tests - Nominal Interest Rates
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates
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Figure A1 continued
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates
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Figure A1 continued
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates
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Figure A2: Rolling Chow Tests - Real Interest Rates
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates
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Figure A2 continued
Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates
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Figure A2 continued
Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates
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